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I. Introduction
Money is the lifeblood of electoral politics.  A political campaign is almost never 
successful unless its resources are comparable to those of its opponents – and the most 
important of these resources is money.  As Alexander Heard described it, political money “is 
a universal, transferable unit infinitely more flexible in its uses than the time, or ideas, or 
talent, or influence, or controlled votes that also constitute contributions to politics.”1
Money has always been crucial to political success, but for modern campaigns it has 
taken on a singular, overriding importance.  In the 2002 congressional elections, 94% of the 
candidates who raised the most money won their races.2  Winners out-raised losers 
approximately four to one.3  The overwhelming correlation between fundraising success and 
electoral victory exists even in primary elections, where the partisan makeup of the district 
does not give any candidate an inherent advantage.  The biggest fundraisers won primary 
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1 ALEXANDER HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY 90 (1960).  Alexander Heard authored this work shortly 
before his tenure as chairman of President Kennedy’s Commission on Campaign Costs.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 31 – 34.
2
 U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, THE ROLE OF MONEY IN THE 2002 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 14 (2003), available 
at http://www.uspirg.org/reports/roleofmoney2003.pdf.
3 Id. at 14.
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elections in 2002 more than 90% of the time.4  Incumbency plays an important role in these 
statistics:  92.7% of House incumbents and 85.7% of Senate incumbents who ran in 2002 won 
re-election.5  The high re-election rate of incumbents, however, is due in no small part to their 
ability to raise large sums of money; in 2002, the average incumbent out-raised his or her 
opponent by a ratio of 4.5-to-1.6
The primacy of television advertising as a modern campaign tactic has increased the 
importance of money.  Federal candidates, parties, and PACs spent more than $1 billion on 
television advertising in 2002.7  More than any other factor, television spending has 
contributed to an “arms race” mentality within political campaigns, steadily escalating from 
election cycle to election cycle without regard to the ads’ consequences for democracy.8
Rather than being a testament to the value of free speech, the modern campaign practice of 
raising millions of dollars in contributions from the privately wealthy and spending most of 
them on a large number of short, repetitive television advertisements undermines the societal 
interest in open and informed debate that is protected by the Constitution’s First Amendment.9
Voters collectively decide who represents them in elected office.  The nature of the 
voters’ decision, however, is determined by innumerable smaller decisions that precede it.  
These decisions – such as which candidates decide to run in the first place, and which 
4
 U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, THE WEALTH PRIMARY 6 (2002), available at
http://www.uspirg.org/reports/WealthPrimary10_02.pdf.
5
 U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, supra note 2, at 31.  The percentage of victorious House incumbents includes those 
incumbents whose districts were eliminated through re-districting, but who successfully sought re-election in 
another district.  Id. at 31 – 32.
6 See id. at 32 (“The average incumbent participating in the 2002 general election raised $1,230,151, compared 
with $270,491 for the average challenger.”).
7
 Alliance for Better Campaigns, Record Political Ad Spending on Television Tops $1 Billion, POL. STANDARD, 
Nov.-Dec. 2002, available at http://www.bettercampaigns.org/standard/display.php?StoryID=270.
8 See, e.g., JOE TRIPPI, THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE TELEVISED: DEMOCRACY, THE INTERNET, AND THE 
OVERTHROW OF EVERYTHING 39 (2004) (“Each year, TV advertising becomes more dominant, more ubiquitous, 
and more expensive, at the same time it becomes less effective.  That’s why in politics we’ve become caught in a 
self-defeating cycle.”) (emphasis in original).
9 Cf. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 650 (1996) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“It is quite wrong to assume that the net effect of limits on contributions and expenditures – which 
tend to protect equal access to the political arena, to free candidates and their staffs from the interminable burden 
of fund-raising, and to diminish the importance of repetitive 30-second commercials – will be adverse to the 
interest in informed debate protected by the First Amendment.”).
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candidates receive the opportunity to communicate their messages effectively to the electorate 
– are heavily influenced by the flow of political money.10  By essentially determining which 
candidates are able to make it onto a given primary or general election ballot, donors help to 
define the field of possibility in American politics.
Despite the importance of monetary participation to the viability of political 
campaigns, the current federal system of campaign finance regulation creates huge obstacles 
to the equal participation of grassroots candidates of all parties and ideologies and the small 
donors who might otherwise support them.  The 2004 presidential campaign has shown that, 
in an election perceived to be of great historical significance, campaigns’ growing use of the 
Internet to reach out to small donors can result in large numbers of small contributions to 
political campaigns.11 In most successful political campaigns for federal office, however, 
small donors play only a marginal role.  Although congressional election campaigns reported 
more than $1 billion in total receipts for the 2002 election cycle,12 only 24% of the money 
raised from individuals came in contributions under $200, accounting for less than 14% of 
candidates’ total receipts.13  By contrast, 55.5% of the money raised from individuals came in 
contributions of $1,000 or more.14  These large contributions came from only approximately 
202,245 donors – less than .09% of the U.S. population.15
In these races, it is the wealthy who are making the crucial early-stage choices of 
which candidates will receive the resources they need to run viable campaigns.  Wealthy 
10 See generally U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, LOOK WHO’S NOT COMING TO WASHINGTON: QUALIFIED CANDIDATES 
SHUT OUT BY BIG MONEY (2003) (profiling forty-nine unsuccessful congressional candidates whose campaigns 
were severely handicapped by their failure to match their opponents’ fundraising), available at 
http://www.uspirg.org/reports/lookwhosnot1_03.pdf.
11 See Linda Feldmann, In politics, the rise of small donors, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 28, 2004 (quoting 
Virginia Professor Larry Sabato as stating that there are “always . . . increases in small gifts when people feel 
very strongly in an election”), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0628/p01s01-uspo.html.
12 U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, supra note 2, at 10 n.e.  Total receipts include contributions from individuals, parties, 
and PACs, as well as personal money and interest earned on campaign accounts.  Id.
13 Id. at 16, 18.
14 Id. at 16.
15 Id. at 15.
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donors have political preferences and concerns that are distinct from those of other 
Americans,16 yet generally only those candidates who appeal to wealthy donors’ concerns are 
able to amass sufficient resources to compete effectively.  Because current federal campaign 
finance laws allow individual contributions to candidates of up to $2,000 per election,17
candidates who could potentially have broad popular appeal but are unable to attract the 
support of wealthy donors find it very difficult to compete.18 Meanwhile, most of the 
American people themselves are marginalized in this “wealth primary,” robbing them of the 
opportunity to have the same voice as wealthy donors in choosing which candidates are able 
to campaign successfully and ultimately to win their elections.19
The wealth primary takes place in the early stages of the American political process 
where political agendas are set and candidates first decide to run for office.  The 
disproportionate level of influence and access that large-dollar contributors acquire through 
the wealth primary is partly responsible for wealthy Americans being more likely to make 
their voices heard in government and to have their interests represented there.20  Meanwhile, 
over the last forty years, voter turnout in federal elections has significantly decreased.21
16 See JOHN GREEN, ET AL., INDIVIDUAL CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTORS: WEALTHY, 
CONSERVATIVE AND REFORM-MINDED (1998) (finding that large-dollar contributors as a group tend to be 
significantly more conservative than the general public).
17
 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 307, 116 Stat. 81, 102 – 03 (to be codified 
at 2 U.S.C. § 441a).
18 See generally U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, supra note 10.
19 See generally Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. & POLICY 
REV. 273, 273 – 332 (1993) (arguing that the decisive role of private wealth in federal elections rises to the level 
of a de facto primary that deprives excluded candidates and citizens of their right to equal protection of the laws 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution).
20 See AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N TASK FORCE ON INEQUALITY & AM. DEMOCRACY, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN AN 
AGE OF RISING INEQUALITY 5 (2004) (“Those who enjoy higher incomes, more occupational success, and the 
highest levels of formal education, are the ones most likely to participate in politics and make their needs and 
values known to government officials.”), available at http://www.apsanet.org/inequality/taskforcereport.pdf.
21 See id. at 6 – 7 (arguing that “a number of ongoing trends discourage voting and reinforce inequalities in voter 
turnout,” including rising economic inequality, felon disenfranchisement laws, and the tendency of major 
political parties to focus their mobilization efforts on those who are already political active and able to make 
political contributions).  The most recent peak in voter turnout in a presidential election was in 1960, when 
62.8% of voting-aged Americans participated in the race between John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon.  CTR. 
FOR VOTING & DEMOCRACY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION VOTER TURNOUT: 1924-2000, at
http://www.fairvote.org/turnout/preturn.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2004).  Official turnout for the 2000 
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Because the wealth primary prevents average Americans from having an equal say in who 
represents them in government, Americans feel less and less invested in the democratic 
process.
When federal campaign contribution limits allow the wealthiest Americans to give far 
more money than most potential donors can afford, many candidates, parties and political 
action committees (“PACs”) lack compelling reasons to pursue small-dollar contributions –
and in the absence of a contest that is perceived to be of such singular importance as the 2004 
presidential race, most Americans lack sufficient incentive to give them.22  In the absence of 
such a particularly important and/or closely fought election, it is only rational for the average 
American to perceive that his or her small contribution does not count for much against the 
contributions of wealthy donors who can afford to give thousands of dollars at a time.23
Two campaign finance reforms that have been prominently advocated in recent years 
address the problem of political equality:  low contribution limits and public financing.  
Lowering campaign contribution limits makes sense as a matter of basic fairness:  
contribution limits should be set at a level that average Americans can afford so that wealthy 
donors are not allowed to systematically outspend average Americans and buy for themselves 
presidential election was 105,586,274 voters, which was 51.3% of the voting-aged population.  FED. ELECTION 
COMM’N, VOTER REGISTRATION AND TURNOUT 2000, at http://www.fec.gov/pages/2000turnout/reg&to00.htm 
(last visited Aug. 26, 2004).  Perhaps even more tellingly, more people watched the Kennedy-Nixon debates in 
1960 than the Bush-Gore debates in 2000, even though America had 100 million fewer people then.  THOMAS E. 
PATTERSON, THE VANISHING VOTER: PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY (2002).
22 See Press Release, Campaign Fin. Inst., CFI Analysis of the Presidential Candidates’ Financial Reports Filed 
June 20 (June 20, 2004) (finding that small contributions to the 2004 presidential candidates were triple and 
large contributions were double the number made in 2000), available at http://www.cfinst.org/pr/063004.html.
23 See, e.g., U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, supra note 10, at 37.  One powerful example of this phenomenon is an 
anecdote told by Victor Morales, the public school government teacher and city councilman for 22 years who 
was the Democratic nominee for Senator in Texas in 1996:
[Morales] secured 44% of the vote against [incumbent Republican Senator] Phil Gramm 
despite being vastly outspent.  Morales raised approximately $900,000 in the last four months 
of his campaign, 87% of which he estimates came from contributions less than $100. . . .  
“During my 1996 campaign,” he [says], “I ran into two of my former students walking out of 
the post office.  They said[,] ‘Mr. Morales, we’re so proud of you.  When we see you on TV, 
we say – that’s our government teacher.  We were going to send you $25 each, but we didn’t 
because we thought ‘what’s $25, he needs millions.’”
Id.
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a greater say in which candidates are able to run successful campaigns. Public financing 
addresses a related concern, giving candidates who qualify a source of funding that is 
independent of donations made from the private wealth of individuals.  Ideally, these two 
reforms would be established alongside one another, reducing the influence of wealthy donors 
while ensuring that candidates are able to run their campaigns on a level playing field.
A third campaign finance reform approach that addresses the problem of political 
equality is the creation of government-sponsored incentive programs to promote small 
political contributions.  Proposals for such programs typically call for the creation of a tax 
credit for political contributions, but they could also involve means outside of the tax code 
such as a contribution refund or campaign finance voucher program.  Although the concept of 
political contribution incentives has been around for decades, the programs have been subject 
to surprisingly little scholarly study.
Proponents of political contribution incentives argue that they will bring into the 
political process new, small-dollar contributors who would otherwise not be able to afford to 
contribute.  Political contribution incentives also would open up the “wealth primary” by 
giving small donors a stronger voice in the American political process and rewarding 
candidates who conduct grassroots, issue-driven campaigns.  Moreover, political campaigns’ 
growing use of the Internet as a cost-effective means to reach out to small donors makes 
political contribution incentives more viable today than ever before.
Opponents of political contribution incentives object chiefly on the grounds that 
experience with the programs shows that they will not work as advertised.  The federal 
government offered a tax credit (and, briefly, a tax deduction) for small political contributions 
from 1972 to 1986.  This tax credit program enjoyed modest success but did not bring about 
large increases in small-dollar contributions.  Several states currently maintain political 
contribution incentive programs, allowing for the study of how different credit programs 
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operate in different legal contexts.  Some of the state tax credit programs that have operated in 
tandem with different campaign finance laws than the federal program have enjoyed greater 
success.
A careful study of experiences at both the state and federal level reveals that the 
structure of a contribution incentive program plays a significant role in determining its 
success.  State programs structured similarly to the federal tax credit program have largely 
replicated the federal experience.  Meanwhile, more successful state programs have made it 
easier for people to claim the incentives and made them available for contributions to a wider 
variety of political actors, including candidates, parties, and PACs.  Moreover, the structure of 
other laws that regulate campaign fundraising has important effects on the success of an 
incentive program.  A political contribution incentive program will be successful at bringing 
in new small donors only if potential recipients of contributions actively solicit those donors 
and encourage them to participate in the incentive program.
A campaign finance voucher program is the most potent, and thus the most promising, 
form of political contribution incentive program.  Tax credits or refund programs require 
individuals in effect to float an interest-free loan to a candidate, party, or PAC while they wait 
for their contribution to be reimbursed.  A voucher program would provide individuals with 
an equal amount of money to make small contributions up front.  An individual’s ability to 
give would not be contingent on whether or not he or she owed taxes or had sufficient 
disposable income.  In the process, individuals participating in a voucher program would do 
so as members of a democracy with an equal status not based on private wealth.  Instead of 
raising money by coddling individual wealthy donors, a voucher program would force 
political actors to compete for its funds through effective communication of political ideas.
This paper will review the history of political contribution incentive programs in the 
United States and conclude that the programs can play an important role in a pragmatic 
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reform strategy to give small donors a central role in the financing of political campaigns.  
Campaign finance voucher systems and other ways to administer political contribution 
incentives outside the tax code should be explored as part of a long-term strategy of creating a 
“small donor democracy.”  Additional reforms, such as low contribution limits and public 
financing, will also be necessary to any comprehensive solution to the problem of political 
equality in campaign finance.  A reform strategy centered on political contribution incentives 
places the power to choose which candidates receive public funding in the hands of individual 
small donors.  These donors can only participate on truly equal terms with one another, 
however, if wealthy donors are prevented from turning private wealth into disproportionate 
political influence.
An “ideal” solution to inequality in campaign finance will only be achieved after years 
of political skirmishing between proponents and opponents of reform.  One step that Congress 
could take right away that could potentially garner immediate bipartisan and cross-ideological 
support would be to establish a new federal tax credit for political contributions.  The tax 
credit should be for a significant amount to provide a strong incentive for small donors to 
contribute, but it should also be set at a low enough level that giving the maximum amount 
will not be out of reach for most Americans.  To encourage maximum participation, the tax 
credit should be available for contributions to candidates, parties, and PACs.  Although many 
campaign finance reform advocates vilify PACs (and the technique of “bundling” individual 
contributions) as a principal evil of campaign finance, the real problem is not the PACs 
themselves, but the political inequality that results when high contribution limits allow PACs 
to leverage private wealth into disproportionate influence over the political process.  Another 
way to encourage participation is through public education efforts that encourage small 
donors to take advantage of the credit.  Finally, the tax credit should be targeted directly at 
small donors by making it claimable only for small contributions when the donor’s total 
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contributions to that candidate, party, or PAC do not exceed the maximum amount of the 
credit during that election cycle.  If a new federal tax credit for political contributions 
designed in this way were proven effective in increasing small donor participation, such 
success could provide momentum for achieving additional reforms.  The tax credit could also 
provide an immediate stimulus to the growth of small donor democracy through Internet-
based grassroots campaigns.
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II. What we know about political contribution incentive programs
A. Legislative history of the federal tax credit for political contributions
The federal government offered targeted tax incentives for political contributions 
between 1972 and 1986.  From 1972 to 1974, taxpayers could choose to claim a 50% tax 
credit for donations to federal, state, and local candidates and party organizations up to a limit 
of $12.50 (or $25 for a married couple filing jointly), or they could choose to take a 100% 
deduction off their adjusted gross income for their first $50 of federal, state, or local 
contributions (or $100 for married couples filing jointly).24  For the tax year 1975, both of 
these tax incentives were doubled, creating a 50% tax credit of up to $25 for individuals and 
$50 for joint returns, and a 100% tax deduction of up to $100 for individuals and up to $200 
for joint returns.25  A few years later, Congress doubled the tax credit again while repealing 
the tax deduction.26
In 1986, Congress reversed course and repealed the political contribution tax credit as 
part of a sweeping simplification of the tax code that eliminated a large number of tax credits 
and deductions.27  Targeted tax incentives still survive as a means for the government to 
promote what it considers socially beneficial activities, however, and since 1986 Congress has 
added many new tax incentives to the code.28
1. Debate and passage of a federal tax credit for political contributions
A federal tax credit for political contributions was first proposed in Congress in the 
1950s.29  In 1957, the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration reported favorably a 
bill that would have created a 50% tax credit for the first $20 of political contributions to 
24
 Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 701, 85 Stat. 497, 560 – 62.
25
 Tariff Schedules Amendments, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-625, § 12, 88 Stat. 2108, 2120.
26
 Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 113, 92 Stat. 2763, 2778.
27
 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 112, 100 Stat. 2085, 2108 – 09.
28 See infra text accompanying notes 82 – 87.
29 HEARD, supra note 1, at 394.
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federal candidates, or an alternative 100% tax deduction for up to $100.30  In October 1961, 
President Kennedy appointed a bipartisan Commission on Campaign Costs to study ways to 
increase public participation in the financing of campaigns.31  The Commission recommended 
tax incentives as a central aspect of its report, calling for the creation of a system where 
taxpayers could choose either a 50% tax credit for their first $20 in contributions or a tax 
deduction for up to $1,000 in contributions.32  According to President Kennedy, “it is essential 
to broaden the base of financial support for candidates and parties.  To accomplish this, 
improvement of public understanding of campaign finance, coupled with a system of 
incentives for solicitation and giving, is necessary.”33  President Kennedy and former 
Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, as well as their campaign opponents, endorsed the 
Commission’s report.34  White House advocacy for these and similar reforms continued 
during the Johnson administration,35 but attempts to create a political contribution incentive as 
part of a broader package of electoral reforms faltered in Congress.  Nevertheless, both 
Republicans and Democrats supported tax incentives as a means of broadening the base of 
contributors to campaigns.36
30 Id. at 448.
31
 President John F. Kennedy, Letter to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House Transmitting 
Bills To Carry out Recommendations of the Commission on Campaign Costs (May 29, 1962), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/site/docs/print_pppus.php?admin=035&year=1962&id=219.  For more 
information on the President’s Commission on Campaign Costs, see generally HERBERT ALEXANDER, MONEY IN 
POLITICS (1972).  Herbert Alexander, who went on to write numerous works on campaign finance, was executive 
director of the Commission.
32
 Kennedy, supra note 31.  In recommending the Commission’s proposal to Congress, President Kennedy 
reduced the amount proposed for the tax deduction from $1000 to $750. Id.  Additionally, the proposed tax 
incentives would only have applied to contributions to national and state political committees.  Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress on Election Reform: The Political Process 
in America (May 25, 1967) (calling for Congress to reconsider the Kennedy Commission’s report, as well as 
alternative proposals for public financing of campaigns), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/site/docs/print_pppus.php?admin=036&year=1967&id=236.
36 See, e.g., Associated Press, G.O.P. Calls for Tax Incentives to Spur Political Contributions, N.Y. TIMES, June 
8, 1967, at 32 (quoting a Republican spokesman arguing in favor of Democratic proposals for tax incentives for 
political contributions as opposed to proposals for public funding of campaigns).
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Championed by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), tax credits for political 
contributions were once again a topic of debate during the Nixon administration.  Senator 
Kennedy attempted to attach a package of election reforms that included creation of a tax 
credit to the Tax Reform Act of 1969; his amendment was tabled by a 50 to 45 vote.37
Senator Kennedy pursued a similar tactic two years later, this time proposing an amendment 
to the Revenue Act of 1971 that provided for tax credits alone.38  This amendment was never 
acted upon, however, as Senator John Pastore (D-R.I.) successfully offered his own campaign 
finance amendment, a more comprehensive proposal that added two titles to the Revenue Act:  
one title that created both tax credits and deductions, and another title that created a tax check-
off to establish a system of partial public financing for presidential campaigns through the 
Presidential Election Campaign Fund.39  Debate on the Pastore Amendment dragged on for 
several days, with most of the attention focused on the more controversial public funding 
provisions.40  Meanwhile, the creation of tax incentives for political contributions enjoyed 
strong support from both parties.41  Ultimately, both titles of the Pastore Amendment passed 
37
 Warren Weaver, Senate Backs Retirement at 60 on Benefits of 66%, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1969, at 1.
38 S. AMDT. 643, 117 CONG. REC. 40,688 – 89 (1971) (providing for a 50% tax credit of up to $12.50 for 
individuals or $25 for joint returns).  Senator Kennedy did not include a tax deduction in his proposal because he 
wanted specifically to target low- and middle-income citizens.  See 117 CONG. REC. 40,688 (1971) (statement of 
Sen. Kennedy).
39 S. AMDT. 692, 117 CONG. REC. 41,758 – 61 (1971).  The Presidential Election Campaign Fund was originally 
established by the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1539.  The 
following year, however, Congress passed a law stating that the Fund could not go into effect until further 
implementing guidelines were adopted.  Act of June 13, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-26, 81 Stat. 57.
40 See, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 41,764 (1971) (statement of Sen. Pastore) (“I think the time has come . . . when 
something has to be done about the idea that a man who runs for President has to be either personally wealthy or 
has to become beholden to a lot of people with vested interests.”); id. at 41,770 (statement of Sen. Howard Baker 
(R- Tenn.)) (“This is not the time for the Congress of the United States to say that the American political system 
has become so incestuous that we are going to provide money from the public funds for our own perpetuation in 
office.”).
41 See, e.g., id. at 42,381 – 82 (statement of Sen. Jack Miller (R-Iowa)).  According to Senator Miller, a tax credit 
for political contributions had a history of support from both parties:
[T]here has always been strong support on this side of the aisle . . . for a limited tax deduction 
or a tax credit on the income tax return for political contributions . . . .  I have done so in order 
that people in general can join in financing the campaigns of political candidates and political 
parties, and let the chips fall where they may.  I see no reason why a tax credit, for example, 
should not work with equal favor to the members of both parties.
Id.
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the Senate. While the public funding provisions passed by a narrow margin of 52 to 47, the 
tax incentive provisions passed by a vote of 82 to 17.42  President Nixon signed the bill into 
law, but only after convincing the House-Senate conference committee to delay the effect of 
the public funding provisions until after the 1972 election.43
2. Effects of federal tax incentives for political contributions from 1972 to 1986
When Congress enacted the tax credit and deduction for political contributions in 
1971, it had little way of knowing how the programs would affect political campaigning.  
Apparently, Congress believed that simply limiting the credit to a small amount of 
contributions was sufficient to target its effects toward small donors.44  Hence, the legislation 
lacked several design features that would likely have encouraged greater citizen participation.  
The tax incentives were not accompanied either by a public education campaign to encourage 
their use or any mechanism to guarantee that the programs were not simply rewarding those 
who were already giving anyway.  Perhaps most importantly, Congress gave no special 
consideration to creating incentives for candidates to solicit credit-subsidized contributions 
actively rather than to continue pursuing large contributions from wealthy donors.
Throughout the 1970s, debate over the best policy approach for addressing citizen 
participation and political equality concerns in political campaigns continued.  As in the 
debate over the Revenue Act of 1971, the two competing policy alternatives before Congress 
were tax incentives and public financing.  Though Congress ultimately rejected more 
expensive proposals for direct public financing and even greater expansions of the tax 
credit,45 Congress twice doubled the amounts of the tax credit “to further expand individual 
42 Id. at 42,632 – 33.
43 See Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, §§ 801 – 802, 85 Stat. 497, 562 – 74.
44 See SEN. RPT. 95-1263, at 59 (1978) (“[S]ince the credit is small, it probably has the greatest incentive effect 
with respect to contributors of moderate amounts.”).
45 See, e.g., Increased Tax Credits for Contributions to Candidates for the U.S. Senate: Hearings on S.1471 
Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 95th Cong. 29 
(1977) [hereinafter Tax Credits Hearings] (debating proposals that would have provided either direct public 
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participation in the electoral process . . . through the encouragement of political 
contributions.”46
Participation rates for the federal tax credit for political contributions between 1972 
and 1986 show that the program was a modest success in its later years.  In 1972, 3.5% of 
those filing tax returns took advantage of either the tax credit or deduction, costing the federal 
treasury a total of $78.8 million.47  After Congress doubled the value of the incentives in 
1975, participation that year was only 2.7%, with a total of $99.0 million in credits and 
deductions claimed.48
For the year 1979, the first year after Congress doubled the amount of the tax credit 
again while repealing the tax deduction, it is possible to calculate participation as a percentage 
of taxpayers who were eligible to claim the credit – i.e., taxpayers who actually owed tax 
liability prior to claiming any tax credits.49  In 1979, 5.5% of eligible filers claimed the credit 
at a cost of $193.5 million. 50  This number rose to a high of 7.2% of eligible tax filers 
claiming $269.8 million during the presidential election year of 1980,51 but ultimately dipped 
financing for Senate candidates or a 75% tax credit for contributions up to $100 to a Senate candidate’s 
campaign).
46 SEN. RPT. 95-1263, at 59 (1978).  At the same time as Congress doubled the tax credit for the second time in 
1978, it also repealed the tax deduction, stating that it “add[s] complexity to the law without serving any 
significant purpose” given that tax credits are a more direct means of encouraging greater political participation.  
H. RPT. 95-1445, at 5 (1978).
47
 Joseph E. Cantor, Campaign Financing in Federal Elections: A Guide to the Law and Its Operation 29 (CRS 
Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 1993).
48 Id.
49
 This percentage is a more accurate measure of participation rates, because it does not count those whose lack 
of tax liability left them with no need for a tax incentive.  Even this percentage is in some senses underinclusive, 
however, because it fails to count those who gave a political contribution that was claimed under the credit but 
did not file their own tax return – i.e., because they were included in a joint return.  This percentage also does not 
include those who would have claimed a tax credit for political contributions but did not need to because their 
tax liability was exhausted after claiming other tax credits.
50 See Cantor, supra note 47, at 29 (reporting that 4.4% of total taxpayers claimed the credit in 1979 at a cost of 
$193.5 million); 2 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN 44 (summer 1982) (reporting 
that in 1979, 74,243,824 owed taxes prior to claiming tax credits out of 92,694,302 tax filers).
51 See Cantor, supra note 47, at 29 (reporting that 5.8% of total taxpayers claimed the credit in 1980 at a cost of 
$269.8 million); 5 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN 80 (fall 1985) (reporting that in 
1980, 76,135,819 owed taxes prior to claiming tax credits out of 93,902,469 tax filers).
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back down and settled at a rate of 5.3% of eligible tax filers claiming $241.7 million for the 
credit’s last year of existence in 1986.52
The participation rates of the federal tax credit for political contributions suggest that 
the credit had at least a marginally positive effect on the number of contributors to political 
campaigns.  Nevertheless, because the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) did not begin 
documenting contributions until 1976, and until 1989 only itemized contributions of more 
than $500,53 it is impossible to know the exact effect that the tax credit for political 
contributions had on small donor participation and influence between 1972 and 1986.
3. Congress repealed the tax credit for political contributions as part of an effort to 
simplify the tax code
Congress repealed the tax credit for political contributions as part of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 (“TRA”).54  The TRA was the result of a bipartisan compromise between the 
Reagan Administration and Democratic leaders in Congress.  The stated intent behind the Act 
was to reduce burdens for the majority of individual taxpayers by simplifying the tax code to 
eliminate loopholes through which more sophisticated taxpayers were avoiding payment of 
the full percentage rate for their income class.55  The TRA’s supporters also argued that 
targeted tax incentives had caused serious unintended consequences, distorting free market 
incentives in ways that produced economically harmful effects.56  The theory behind the TRA 
52 See Cantor, supra note 47, at 29 (reporting that 4.5% of total taxpayers claimed the credit in 1986 at a cost of 
$241.7 million); 10 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN 104 (fall 1990) (reporting that 
in 1986, 86,975,883 owed taxes prior to claiming tax credits out of 103,299,601 tax filers).
53 FED. ELECTION COMM’N, YOUR GUIDE TO RESEARCHING PUBLIC RECORDS, at 
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/prguide1.htm (last visited July 1, 2004).  In 1989, the FEC began tracking itemized 
contributions of $200 or more.  Id.  Because of this, even today the number of small donors to campaigns is only 
an estimate.  Exact numbers are only knowable if the campaign self-reports.
54
 Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
55 See David E. Rosenbaum, Tax Revision Bill Wins Passage in the House on Shift in G.O.P. Votes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 18, 1985, at A1.
56 See H. RPT. 99-426 (1985).  The House Ways and Means Committee’s report argued that
[t]ax incentives, even if individually designed to promote desired objectives, collectively cause 
significant economic distortions and increase the burden of the tax system in other sectors of 
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was that all taxpayers would benefit from a simpler tax code; in reducing administrative 
burdens and opportunities for tax avoidance, the government could afford to tax at lower rates 
across all income classes.  Many of the Act’s supporters thus argued that it was designed to 
favor the interests of average Americans over those of the wealthy and large corporations.57
The tax credit for political contributions was swept up in this larger movement to 
simplify the tax code.  The tax legislation that emerged from the House Ways and Means 
Committee repealed the credit along with a variety of other tax preferences.58  The New York 
Times reported that even lawmakers who otherwise supported political contribution incentives 
“were reluctant to challenge the President and [Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan 
Rostenkowski (D-Ill.)] on such a relatively minor topic.”59  While the bill was pending in the 
House, however, Representatives Matthew McHugh (D-N.Y.) and Thomas Tauke (R-Iowa) 
introduced a proposal that would have replaced the 50% tax credit for contributions to federal, 
state and local candidates with a 100% tax credit that applied only to contributions to 
congressional candidates from the candidate’s home state up to $100 (or $200 for married 
couples filing jointly).60  Although the McHugh Amendment was rejected by the Ways and 
Means Committee, Democrats in the Rules Committee succeeded in allowing for its 
consideration on the floor, and it passed by a vote of 230 to 196.61  The Senate, however, did 
the economy. Incentives designed to encourage investment and increase productivity often 
have unintended results, such as the substitution of less productive, but tax-favored, assets for 
more productive investments. . . .  In many cases, such investments are made only because 
they produce large deductions and credits that may be used to offset other income, and, 
importantly, not because there is a market demand for the services provided by these 
investments.
Id.
57 See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. 35,836 (1985) (statement of Rep. Pete Stark (D-Cal.)) (“A vote for the bill is a vote 
for [the] citizen taxpayer. . . .  If you have billions of dollars in a sector rich in tax shelters, then you are against 
the bill.”).
58 See H. RPT. 99-426 (1985).  Among other changes, the bill repealed the regular investment tax credit, partially 
repealed the tax credit for fuels from non-conventional sources, and abolished a variety of “tax shelters” such as 
the two-earner deduction for couples and tax exclusions for the first $100 in dividends.  Id.
59
 David E. Rosenbaum, Panel Votes to End Political Tax Credit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1985, at D6.
60
 131 CONG. REC. 37,374 – 75 (1985).
61
 Rosenbaum, supra note 55.
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not include a similar proposal in its version of the bill,62 and the provision did not survive the 
House-Senate conference.
The legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reveals that Congress had three 
primary motives for repealing the tax credit for political contributions.  First, many 
congressional supporters of the Act felt it inappropriate to retain the credit on the one hand 
while on the other hand eliminating many credits and incentives for other activities.63  Some 
members of Congress even argued that retaining the credit (or expanding it through the 
McHugh Amendment) would smack of self-dealing and corruption.64  Second, TRA 
proponents questioned the efficacy of the credit as a means of encouraging new, small-dollar 
contributions, given that IRS data suggested that political contribution incentives were used 
disproportionately by wealthy taxpayers.65  Finally, proponents of the repeal questioned 
whether giving a small credit ($50 under the law at the time) was worth the administration 
and verification costs to the IRS.66
The McHugh Amendment was designed to respond to some of these concerns.  Its 
congressional proponents argued that it was an important (if incremental) campaign finance 
reform measure, and not simply a tax preference for members of Congress.67  Though 
62 See SEN. RPT. 99-313 (1986).
63 See id.  
64 See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1986: Hearings on H.R. 3838 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong. 
68-73 (1986) [hereinafter TRA Hearings] (statement of Rep. Bill Frenzel (R-Minn.)) (calling the McHugh 
Amendment “a terrible case of greed and selfishness on the part of Congress”).  Representative Frenzel had 
previously been a proponent of tax credits, arguing that unlike direct public funding schemes, tax credits 
encourage civic participation.  See Tax Credits Hearings, supra note 45 (statement of Rep. Frenzel).  Nine years 
later, however, Frenzel expressed serious doubts about the efficacy of tax credits, and stated that three quarters 
of contributions claimed under the tax credit went to incumbents.  See TRA Hearings, supra, at 68 (“[I]f we are 
all going to sacrifice by giving up some tax preferences, it seems to me Congress ought to be willing to give 
[some] up too.”).  
65 See SEN. RPT. 99-313 (1986).  For a discussion of the IRS data, see Guy Lincoln Smith, A Third Way in 
Campaign Finance Reform: Political Contribution Credits and Their Role in Increasing Political Equality 81 –
84, unpublished Harvard University senior thesis (2001) (on file with author, used with permission).
66 See SEN. RPT. 99-313 (1986).
67 See 131 CONG. REC. 35,949 (1985) (statement of Rep. McHugh) (“[W]e are offering a modest, but very 
important proposal, which will give a meaningful incentive to candidates for congressional office in the House or 
the Senate to go out and get more participation from small contributors.”).  The Democratic Study Group 
(“DSG”), a partisan think tank, was one of the original proponents of the idea to increase the tax credit to 100% 
Toward a Small Donor Democracy:  The Past and Future of Incentive Programs for Small Political Contributions 17
opponents of the amendment argued that providing a credit only for congressional candidates 
(and not state or local candidates) was tantamount to self-dealing, Representative McHugh 
presented it as a way to narrow the scope of the credit as a cost-saving measure in an effort to 
keep the provision roughly revenue-neutral.68  At the same time, the McHugh Amendment 
doubled the dollar value of contributions claimable under the credit and made it into a full 
100% credit, thus strengthening its incentive value and addressing the charge that the credit 
was too small to justify IRS expenditures on administration and verification.69  Even as 
experience with the federal credit suggested that it was not performing as well as its creators 
intended, the McHugh Amendment represented a reasonable effort to strengthen the credit in 
response to criticism.
Nevertheless, opposition from some unexpected quarters raised obstacles to the 
inclusion of the McHugh Amendment in the TRA.  In a move that divided campaign reform 
advocates on the Act, Common Cause President Fred Wertheimer and longtime campaign 
reform advocate Representative David Obey (D-Wisc.) spoke out against the McHugh 
Amendment before Congress.70  Wertheimer and Obey both argued that the McHugh 
Amendment’s expansion of the tax credit for political contributions, if enacted on its own, 
would only aggravate what they saw as the greater problem, the disproportionate political 
influence of PACs.  According to their argument, the practice of PACs “bundling” individual 
contributions to candidates – i.e., encouraging individuals to write checks to particular 
candidates, and then collecting those individual contributions and delivering them together –
to encourage small-donor participation and to counter the increasing role of political action committees 
(“PACs”) in political fundraising.  Thomas B. Edsall, PACs Outpacing Individuals; Study Says Small Donors 
Disappearing From Politics, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1985, at A8.
68 See id.
69 See supra text accompanying notes 60, 66.
70
 Richard E. Cohen, Giving Their All, NAT’L J., Dec. 14, 1985, at 2886.  
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would be subsidized by expanding the credit without enacting additional reforms.71
Supporters of the McHugh Amendment argued that its provisions addressed the bundling 
issue by limiting the credit to in-state contributions and through an additional provision that 
made contributions through a third party ineligible for the credit.72  With the campaign reform 
community unable to present a united front on the merits of a tax credit for political 
contributions, the credit ended up a casualty of legislative maneuvering over the TRA.
4. The federal tax code today contains billions of dollars in tax credits
Though the most ardent proponents of tax simplification sought to remove all forms of 
targeted tax incentives from the tax code in 1986,73 the TRA was only a small step in this 
direction.  Even as it eliminated tax incentives such as the tax credit for political 
contributions, the Act retained and even strengthened other tax incentive programs such as the 
Earned Income Tax Credit, the tax deduction for charitable contributions, and the tax credit 
for rehabilitation of historic structures.74
The next step for congressional supporters of the elimination of tax incentive 
programs was the passage of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (“BEA”).75  The BEA 
placed restrictions on Congress’ ability to legislate through the tax code, requiring that tax 
changes resulting in revenue loss be offset by tax increases or the elimination of other tax 
71
 In testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, Wertheimer argued that the McHugh Amendment would 
make bundling a more effective tool for PACs, but that could be a valuable piece of a broader package of 
reforms.  TRA Hearings, supra note 64, at 175-183 (1986) (statement of Fred Wertheimer, Pres., Common 
Cause).  Representative Obey made similar arguments to his Democratic colleagues, but also played on partisan 
fears, claiming that Republicans would be able to use bundling and other sophisticated fundraising techniques to 
take better advantage of an expanded tax credit.  Cohen, supra note 70.
72 See Cohen, supra note 70 (quoting Richard P. Conlen, executive director of DSG).  For the text of these 
provisions, see 131 CONG. REC. 37,374 – 75 (1985).
73 See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. 37,446 (1985) (statement of Rep. Bill Archer (R-Tex.)) (arguing that tax credits for 
political contributions “put[] us even farther away from a return-free system”).
74 See H. RPT. 99-841 (1986).
75
 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 13001 – 13501, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-
573 – 1388-630 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
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preferences in order to keep any such changes revenue-neutral.76  These “pay-as-you-go” or 
“PAYGO” requirements were intended to prevent the enactment of new tax incentives from 
undermining the simplification of the tax code accomplished by the TRA.77
Even with the budgetary restrictions, however, in the early 1990s the amount of 
money that the government spent through tax credits and other “tax expenditures” quickly 
rose back toward the level it had been at prior to the TRA.78  In the late 1990s, federal budget 
surplus projections often induced Congress to bypass or waive the BEA requirements on an 
ad hoc basis.79  The politics of a budget surplus made “pay as you go” seem less necessary, 
and Congress allowed the BEA requirements to expire for most categories of expenditure in 
October 2002.80  Since then, the return of federal budget deficits has led many in Congress to 
call for the reinstatement of PAYGO requirements, but the politics surrounding the issue 
make it unlikely that Congress will revive the requirements in the foreseeable future.81
76 See id.  The Office of Management and Budget was required to monitor congressional compliance with the 
BEA requirements.  2 U.S.C. § 902(b) (2000).  If at the end of the session congressional tax changes resulted in a 
net loss to the government, the Office was required to “sequester” (i.e., eliminate) certain expenditures according 
to a pre-established formula in order to eliminate the deficit increase.  See id. § 902(b). 
77 See Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax Legislative Processes, 43 B.C. L. 
REV. 863, 884 (2002) (arguing that “[c]odification of the PAYGO rules in 1990 was an indication that Congress 
did not trust itself” to remain true to the spirit of tax simplification underlying the TRA).
78 GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., REP. NO. GAO/GDD/AIMD-94-122, TAX POLICY: TAX EXPENDITURES DESERVE 
MORE SCRUTINY 35 – 37 (1994).  See also David E. Rosenbaum, Favoring Tax Cuts and Tolerating Deficits, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2004, at A4 (“[O]ne of the guiding principles of [President] Reagan’s tax policy, 
simplifying the tax code by eliminating narrow tax breaks, was abandoned by subsequent presidents of both 
parties who preferred to use tax preferences to meet various social and economic goals and satisfy special 
interests.”).
79 See EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRES., OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 
FISCAL YEAR 2002: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 243 (2001) (“With the arrival of budget surpluses in 1998, 
Congress and the [Clinton] Administration began to skirt the budget enforcement mechanisms.”).  
80 EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRES., OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL 
YEAR 2004: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 315 (2003).
81
 During debate over the 2005 budget, a budget amendment creating a new version of the PAYGO requirements 
narrowly passed the Senate over the objections of the Bush Administration and congressional leadership.  
Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Senate Raises Bar to Enact New Tax Cuts; Rebuff to Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2004, at 
A24.  A resolution supporting the change failed to pass on a tie vote in the House.  Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Bush 
Plans For Tax Cuts Barely Avert House Setback, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004, at A18.  President Bush and 
congressional leaders have resisted reviving the “pay-as-you-go” principle that changes to the tax code should be 
revenue-neutral because it would make it virtually impossible to make permanent major tax cuts passed in 2001 
and 2003.  Edmund L. Andrews, Mutiny by 4 Republicans Over Bush’s Tax Cutting Forces Delay on Budget 
Vote, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2004, at A18.
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Despite continuing criticism from some members of Congress that the use of targeted 
tax incentives is harmful to the economy,82 the federal government uses tax credits and similar 
tax preferences in many areas to promote what it considers socially beneficial activities.  In 
the years following the passage of the BEA, many new tax incentives were added to the tax 
code, including tax credits that benefit the disabled,83 the environment,84 and education.85  In 
2002, more than 40.6 million American taxpayers claimed tax credits on their individual 
returns, in amounts totaling $39 billion.86  Of this money, the vast majority went to finance 
three tax credits:  the Child Tax Credit, which cost the government $21.6 billion; the Foreign 
Tax Credit, which cost the government $5.2 billion; and the various education tax credits, 
which cost the government $4.9 billion.87  By comparison, the cost of the tax credit for 
political contributions was only $269.8 million in its peak year of 1980.88
B. Political contribution incentives at the state level
The design of the original federal tax credit for political contributions limited its 
effectiveness.  Experience with political contribution incentive programs, however, is not 
limited to the federal level.  Many states have implemented their own version of a tax credit 
82 See, e.g., U.S. CONG. JT. ECON. COMM., INEFFICIENCY OF TARGETED TAX POLICIES (1997) (arguing that 
targeted tax incentives artificially lower the costs of some activities in ways that distort the free market and cause 
unintended consequences that frequently undermine their incentive value).
83 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11611, 104 Stat. 1388, 1501 – 03 
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 44 (2000)) (establishing the Disabled Access Credit).
84
 There are multiple tax credits designed to encourage environmentally friendly activities, including credits for 
qualified electric vehicles and the production of energy from renewable sources.  See Energy Policy Act of 1992, 
Pub. L. No. 102-486, §§ 1913(b)(1), 1914(a), 106 Stat. 2776, 3019 – 20 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 
30, 45 (2000)) (establishing tax credits for qualified electric vehicles and energy production from certain 
renewable sources).  
85 See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 201, 111 Stat. 788, 799 – 806 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 
25A (2000)) (establishing the Hope Scholarship Credit and the Lifetime Learning Credit).
86 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS: SELECTED INCOME AND TAX ITEMS FOR 
SPECIFIED TAX YEARS, 1985 – 2002 (2004), at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02in01si.xls (last visited June 30, 
2004).  This data is preliminary data only, revised by the Internal Revenue Service as of May 2004.  Id.
87 Id.  Not included amongst these numbers is the Earned Income Credit, which unlike most tax credits offered 
by the federal government is refundable – i.e., claimants are entitled to a refund of any credit amount in excess of 
the claimant’s tax liability.  See id.
88 See supra text accompanying note 51.  At that time, the political contributions credit was only a 50% tax credit 
for the first $50 of an individual’s contributions ($100 for joint returns).  See supra text accompanying notes 24
– 26.
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for political contributions, including Oregon, Arkansas, Ohio, and Virginia.  Meanwhile, 
Minnesota takes a slightly different approach, operating a Political Contribution Refund 
(“PCR”) program outside of its tax system.89  Recent experience with incentive programs for 
small-dollar political contributions at the state level suggests several ways in which the design 
of an incentive program can be tailored to promote small-donor participation in political 
campaigns more effectively.
1. Details of the state programs
Oregon has the oldest of the current state political contribution incentive programs, 
having provided a tax credit for political contributions in some form since 1969.90   The 
Oregon tax credit also has had the highest participation rate of any state’s political 
contribution incentive program, with an average of 4.5% of its taxpayers participating per 
year during the 1990s.91  After the TRA repealed the federal tax credit in 1986, Oregon 
increased the coverage of its credit from 50% to 100% for contributions up to $50 (or $100 
for joint returns) to federal, state, and local candidates, parties, and PACs.92  In 1994, Oregon 
voters passed Measure 9,93 a ballot initiative championed by OSPIRG and other reform 
groups that set low contribution limits for state candidates, parties, and PACs94 and made tax 
credits for contributions available only for candidates who agreed to abide by voluntary 
spending limits.95  The Measure 9 provisions were in effect for only a few years before the 
89
 Arizona also has a tax credit for political contributions, but unlike those discussed here, the credit is not 
available for contributions to candidates, but instead only applies to contributions made to the state’s nonpartisan 
Clean Elections Fund.  For a discussion of the Arizona credit, see David Rosenberg, Broadening the Base: The 
Case for a New Federal Tax Credit for Political Contributions 56 – 60 (American Enterprise Institute, 2002).  
90
 Rosenberg, supra note 89, at 24.  For a discussion of the creation of Oregon’s tax credit in 1969, see 
ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 194.
91
 Rosenberg, supra note 89, at 26.
92
 1987 Or. Laws 470 – 71.
93
 1995 Or. Laws 1 – 11.
94 Id. at 3.  Measure 9 limited individual and PAC contributions to $500 for candidates for statewide office and 
$100 for candidates for the state legislature, parties, and PACs.  Id.
95 Id. at 9 – 10.  Measure 9 set different voluntary spending limits for the primary and general election.  Id. at 5.  
In the primary, candidates for governor could spend no more than $500,000; candidates for other statewide 
office could spend no more than $200,000; candidates for state senator could spend no more than $30,000; and 
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Oregon Supreme Court struck down its contribution limits because they violated the “free 
expression” clause of the Oregon Constitution.96  The absence of contribution limits 
undermined participation in the tax credit program as many candidates chose to decline credit-
eligible contributions to avoid consenting to spending limits.97  In response to the Oregon 
Supreme Court’s decision, the state legislature restored the tax credit’s availability for the first 
$50 (or $100 for joint returns) of contributions to all federal, state, and local candidates, 
parties, and PACs.98
In 1996, Arkansas voters passed Initiated Act 1, establishing a tax credit that 
reimburses 100% of an individual’s first $50 ($100 for joint returns) in contributions to state 
candidates, parties, and PACs.99  The Act also established a series of low contribution limits 
for state campaigns – $300 for statewide executive offices such as governor and secretary of 
state and $100 for state legislative and judicial offices – and empowered local governments to 
set low contribution limits for their own races.100  The low contribution limits applied both to 
contributions from individuals to ordinary PACs and to contributions from ordinary PACs to 
candidates for state representative could spend no more than $20,000.  Id.  The limits were set at double these 
amounts for each office in the general election.  Id.  In addition to being ineligible for tax credit-reimbursed 
contributions, candidates who did not agree to limit their spending had a statement to that effect placed next to 
their names in the official voter pamphlet.  Id. at 6 – 7.
96
 VanNatta v. Keisling, 931 P.2d 770 (Or. 1997).  The Oregon Supreme Court’s holding was on independent 
state law grounds, as the Court interpreted the state constitutional guarantee in an even stricter fashion than the 
United States Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment.  See id. at 775 – 76 (rejecting Buckley v. 
Valeo’s holding that restrictions on contributions are less threatening to freedom of expression than restrictions 
on expenditures).  The Court rejected, however, a similar claim that Measure 9’s voluntary spending limits 
violated the “free expression” clause.  Id. at 787 – 89.  The Court found that neither the linkage of tax credit 
eligibility to acceptance of the spending limits nor the voter pamphlet statement of candidate compliance with 
the limits was sufficiently coercive as to place an impermissible burden on candidates’ speech.  Id.
97 See Smith, supra note 65, at 79 – 80.  In 1996, when Measure 9’s contribution limits were still in effect, 95.8% 
of primary election candidates and 83.75% of general election candidates agreed to spending limits.  Id.  In 1998, 
after the Oregon Supreme Court had struck down the contribution limits, only 61.4% of primary election 
candidates and 10.31% of general election candidates agreed to spending limits.  Id.  These statistics demonstrate 
that the success of Measure 9’s voluntary spending limits depended on its low contribution limits to give 
candidates a reason not to opt out of the system.  Evidently, the lure of raising and spending campaign funds in 
unlimited amounts was to great for 89.69% of Oregon’s candidates in the 1998 general election.
98
 S.B. 369, 1999 Or. Laws 2464, 2477 – 78 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 316.102 (2001)).
99 ARK. CODE § 7-6-222 (2000).  
100
 Rosenberg, supra note 89, at 51.
Toward a Small Donor Democracy:  The Past and Future of Incentive Programs for Small Political Contributions 23
candidates.101  Perhaps the most innovative provision of Initiated Act 1, however, was its 
creation of a new kind of political entity, the small donor PAC.102  Small donor PACs, which 
could also accept credit-eligible contributions, operated under a different set of rules than 
regular PACs:  in return for only accepting contributions from individuals of $25 or less, 
small donor PACs could give up to $2,500 in contributions to a candidate.103  Initiated Act 1’s 
low contribution limits, tax credits for political contributions, and favorable treatment of small 
donor PACs were clearly designed to give average Americans a greater opportunity to 
participate in political campaigns and to force candidates to engage in a style of campaigning 
that was more responsive to grassroots constituencies from across the political spectrum.
Opponents of Initiated Act 1, including the Associated Industries of Arkansas PAC, 
challenged its provisions in federal court.104  In 1998, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
issued a decision that struck down the Act’s contribution limits as well as a pre-Act 
contribution limit of $200 for contributions from individuals to PACs.105  The court reinstated 
the state’s prior limit of $1,000 for contributions from individuals and PACs to candidates and 
also reduced the contribution limit for small donor PACs from $2,500 to $1,000 to align it 
with that of ordinary PACs.106  In the aftermath of the Eighth Circuit’s decision, then, 
101
 Ark. Ethics Comm’n, Advisory Op. No. 98-EC-017 (Aug. 27, 1998), available at
http://www.arkansasethics.com/opinions/98-EC-017.htm.
102
 Rosenberg, supra note 89, at 51.  According to a survey of state campaign finance laws done by the National 
Conference of State Legislatures, the only other state that creates a special classification for small donor PACs is 
Colorado.  NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS., LIMITS ON PAC CONTRIBUTIONS TO CANDIDATES, at 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/about/PACCand.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2004).
103 Id.
104
 Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1001 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 
1145 (1999).
105 See id. (holding that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that low contribution limits were 
necessary to support Arkansas’ interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption).  The Eighth 
Circuit’s interpretation of the First Amendment was later seriously undermined by the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, which upheld a similar initiative passed in Missouri that established low 
contribution limits.  See 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (upholding Missouri contribution limits of $1,000 for constitutional 
offices and $250 for other offices, indexed for inflation).  Thus, if Arkansas were to enact Initiated Act 1’s low 
contribution limits again today, a federal court would likely find them constitutionally acceptable.
106 Russell, 146 F.3d at 568 – 72.  The court reasoned that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment required parity between the amount an ordinary PAC and a small donor PAC were allowed to 
contribute to candidates, even though after the court’s decision ordinary PACs were able to receive unlimited 
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individuals are no longer limited in the amount that they can give to ordinary PACs, and while 
small donor PACs still exist, they can no longer contribute more to candidates than can 
ordinary PACs.  In eliminating these advantages over ordinary PACs, the Eighth Circuit 
seriously undermined the ability of states to provide for small donor PACs that empower 
small donors vis-à-vis the large-dollar contributors who have historically dominated campaign 
finance.107
Initiated Act 1’s tax credit for political contributions no longer serves the same 
purpose following the modification of the law by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.  
Whereas the tax credit was originally intended to provide an incentive for a larger number of 
small donors to make contributions to increase the pool of money available to candidates as a 
complement to the Act’s low contribution limits,108 it now may be used to reimburse portions 
of contributions to candidates that may run as high as $1,000, or contributions to ordinary 
PACs that can be for any amount.
Ohio and Virginia also offer tax credits for political contributions, but neither state’s 
credit program includes parties, PACs, or federal candidates.  Ohio provides a 100% tax credit 
for the first $50 (or $100 for joint returns) in contributions to state candidates.109  Ohio law 
limits individual and PAC contributions to candidates to $2,500; individual and PAC 
contributions from wealthy donors while small donor PACs would still exist as entities that collected 
contributions in amounts of $25 or less.  Id. at 572.  
107 See Zach Polett, Empower Citizens, BOSTON REV., Apr./May 1997 (describing the aims of Initiated Act 1’s 
proponents), available at http://bostonreview.net/BR22.2/polett.html.  According to the director of national 
political operations for the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (“ACORN”), one of the 
groups whose organizing and lobbying efforts helped to pass Initiated Act 1,
What makes the small-donor PAC particularly effective as a campaign finance reform tool is 
its combination with the contribution limits of the initiative. Under the initiative, regular PACs 
and individuals can contribute no more than $100 per election to a candidate (or $300 for a 
statewide race) while small-donor PACs are allowed to contribute up to $2,500. Thus small-
donor PACs empower small donors while decreasing the power of traditional, large-donor 
PACs. They also have the advantage of putting more money into the system, thus answering 
one of the objections raised to relatively low contribution limits.
Id.
108 See id.
109 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5747.29 (2002).
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contributions to parties to $5,000 for county parties and $15,000 for state parties; and 
individual contributions to PACs to $5,000.110  Virginia offers a 50% credit on the first $25 
(or $50 for joint returns) of contributions to state and local candidates during the year they are 
up for election.111  Virginia law does not limit contributions to candidates or PACs.112
In 1992, Minnesota created its PCR program, which offers refunds for 100% of 
contributions up to $50 per person to political parties and candidates who agree to abide by 
spending limits.113  The program is administered outside of the tax system, with refunds 
issued typically within four to six weeks after the contributor submits an official receipt to the 
state’s Department of Revenue.114  The Minnesota legislature enacted the contribution refund 
program as a supplement to its system of partial public financing, which had been in existence 
since 1974.115  Participation in the public funding system in Minnesota is high, and public 
funds represent a significant portion of total campaign funds used by candidates;  in 2002, 
approximately 25% of all candidate funds came from direct public financing.116  Like PCR 
money, these public funds are available to candidates only if they abide by spending limits.117
The spending limits are adjusted periodically for inflation; in 2002, spending limits were set at 
$27,380 for candidates for State Representative; $54,740 for candidates for the State Senate; 
$182,350 for candidates for Secretary of State and State Auditor; $364,690 for candidates for 
Attorney General; and $2,188,090 for candidates for Governor and Lieutenant Governor.118
110 Id. § 3517.102.
111 VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-339.6 (2000).
112
 Rosenberg, supra note 89, at 61.
113 MINN. STAT. § 290.06(23) (2002).
114
 Rosenberg, supra note 89, at 36.
115 See Graham P. Ramsden & Patrick D. Donnay, Impact of Minnesota’s Political Contribution Refund 
Program on Small-Donor Behavior in State House Races, 33 STATE & LOCAL GOV’T REV. 32, 33 (2001) 
(detailing history of PCR’s enactment).
116 See MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. DISCLOSURE BD., 2002 CAMPAIGN FINANCE SUMMARY (reporting total 
contributions and total public subsidies received by state candidates in 2002), at 
http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/Summary02/CFSUMM2002.pdf (last visited June 22, 2004).
117 MINN. STAT. § 10A.322 (2002).
118 Id. § 10A.25(2).  In 2004, only members of the Minnesota House of Representatives are up for election.  The 
2004 spending limit for candidates for this office is $28,400.  MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. DISCLOSURE BD., 
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First-time candidates receive a 10% increase in their spending limit.119  Candidates who win 
in a contested primary election may spend 120% of their spending limits.120  In non-election 
years, spending limits are set at 20% of election-year limits.121  Studies have suggested that 
Minnesota’s system of campaign finance regulation has resulted in more competitive elections 
in the state than would have taken place under a system of regulations patterned after the 
federal model.122
2. Comparing effects of different state programs
As Justice Louis Brandeis wrote in the first half of the twentieth century, “It is one of 
the happy accidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory, and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to 
the rest of the country.”123 Brandeis’ laboratory metaphor is apt for a discussion of political 
contribution incentives.  In particular, the Minnesota and Oregon political contribution 
incentive programs serve as instructive case studies that suggest ways in which a new federal 
incentive program for political contributions might be structured.
Those states that have offered tax credits without any additional reforms have largely 
replicated the federal experience.  Ohio, Arkansas, and Virginia all have credits that 
2004 CONTRIBUTION AND EXPENDITURE LIMITS, at http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/campfin/CONTLTEY.htm 
(last visited June 22, 2004).
119 MINN. STAT. § 10A.25(2)(d) (2002).  Minnesota law defines a first-time candidate as “a candidate who is 
running for that office for the first time and who has not run previously for any other office whose territory now 
includes a population that is more than one-third of the population in the territory of the new office.”  Id.
120 Id. § 10A.25(5).  A candidate qualifies for the contested primary spending bonus if the candidate “received 
fewer than twice as many votes as any one of the candidate’s opponents in [the] primary . . . .”  Id.
121 Id. § 10A.25(6). Contributions limits in Minnesota are similarly structured.  Individual contribution limits 
during election years are $500 for state legislative campaigns, $1,000 for the Attorney General’s campaign, and 
$2,000 for campaigns for Governor and Lieutenant Governor.  Id. § 10A.27.  During non-election years, these 
limits are set at $100, $200, and $500, respectively.  Id.  Any contribution or expenditure over $100 from a 
corporation or other association must come from a segregated political fund.  Id. § 10A.12.
122 See Patrick D. Donnay & Graham P. Ramsden, Public Financing of Legislative Elections: Lessons from 
Minnesota, 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 351, 351 – 64 (1995) (finding that the Minnesota system of public financing 
helps challengers more than incumbents in state legislative elections, making them more competitive); Kenneth 
R. Mayer, Public Financing and Electoral Competition in Minnesota and Wisconsin 17 (Citizens Res. Found., U. 
of So. Cal., 1998) (arguing that the Minnesota system has resulted in “state legislative elections . . . [that] are 
vigorously contested, with voters offered viable alternatives in nearly every race”).
123 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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essentially stand on their own as methods of encouraging citizen involvement in political 
campaigns, and though their relatively recent enactment means that data are limited, the three 
states’ programs have all experienced modest participation rates.  The programs’ effects on
small donor participation are less clear.  In the early years of the Ohio tax credit, the 
program’s participation rate has never exceeded 0.5%, and the number of small-dollar 
contributions has changed only slightly.124  Data from Arkansas and Virginia tell similar 
stories, though these states have newer credit programs that preclude drawing state-specific 
conclusions.  As with the old federal credit and the Ohio credit, political contribution 
incentives in these two states have shown modest participation rates.125
Unlike other political contribution incentive programs, the structure of the Minnesota 
PCR program encourages parties and candidates to solicit small-dollar contributions actively.  
The state gives official receipt books to candidates and parties, who then offer the receipts to 
donors to submit with their refund applications.126  With refunds issued year- round, 
candidates can promise prospective donors a refund in a matter of weeks, enhancing their 
fundraising efforts.127  Moreover, since the contribution refunds are only available for 
donations to those candidates who abide by spending limits and receive a large portion of 
their campaign budget from public funds,128 candidates whose appeal is primarily to 
grassroots constituencies – regardless of party or ideology – have more of an opportunity to 
compete on a level playing field.
124
 Rosenberg, supra note 89, at 48 – 49.  In the four-year cycle following the introduction of Ohio’s tax credit 
for political contributions, contributions of $50 or less to campaigns for statewide offices rose less than 5%.  Id.
More recent data on the efficacy of the Ohio tax credit has been gathered by the Campaign Finance Institute, 
which surveyed Ohio citizens and found that public education about the program could lead to a substantially 
greater participation rate.  See infra text accompanying notes 218 – 220.
125 See Rosenberg, supra note 89, at 53 (finding that “[t]he Arkansas tax credit is getting more popular but 
remains . . . a minor piece of the campaign finance system” that has not had a significant impact on state 
elections); id. at 63 (finding that the Virginia credit has had only “a tiny impact on campaign finances” and has 
had no demonstrable effect on small-dollar contributions). 
126 Id. at 36.
127 See id. at 42 – 43.
128 MINN. STAT. § 290.06(23) (2002).
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Because the Minnesota PCR program operates as a refund rather than as a traditional 
tax credit, it reduces an eligible donor’s costs of making a political contribution to a greater
degree than traditional tax credits do.  In studying what motivates individual donors to make 
political contributions, political scientists have found strong evidence that the likelihood that 
an individual will make a political contribution is almost entirely dependent on his or her 
family’s income level.129  Even more so than a traditional tax credit, a program like 
Minnesota’s that is designed to reimburse small donors for their political contributions within 
weeks after they are made has the potential to make an individual’s likelihood to contribute to 
a campaign less dependent on his or her ability to do so.  
One recent study by a Harvard University student suggests that contributions to 
candidates made under the Minnesota PCR program are not predominantly determined by the 
income level of the candidate’s supporters.130  Based on a detailed analysis of contribution 
refund program data,131 the study found that the income level of some candidates’ districts 
actually showed a slight negative relationship to the candidates’ ability to raise PCR program 
funds.132  According to the study, the data show that characteristics of the candidate, rather 
than characteristics of the district, are the crucial determinants of a candidate’s PCR 
fundraising ability.133  For example, a candidate’s status as an incumbent and success at 
129 See SIDNEY VERBA, ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY 361 (1995) (“[I]n accounting for the volume of 
contributions to politics, family income is, overwhelmingly, the dominant factor.  To give money one needs 
money and, apparently, little else.”).
130
 Smith, supra note 65, at 97 – 118.
131
 More detailed conclusions about patterns of donor behavior are possible for Minnesota’s PCR program than 
for federal or state tax credits because in operating the contribution refund program outside of its tax system, 
Minnesota tracks a different set of credit usage data than does the IRS or most other states.  Instead of recording 
the income class of those who take advantage of the credit, Minnesota maintains data on which candidates and 
parties are recipients of the funds, and in what amounts.  Id. at 73 – 74.  This more detailed set of data allows for 
more sophisticated analyses of donor behavior than are possible using only aggregate taxation statistics.  Id. at 
108 – 18.
132 See id. at 115 (finding that in the 1996 election cycle, the income level of a State Senate candidate’s had a 
negative correlation with the amount of PCR money they raised).  This was the case even though in Minnesota, 
Republicans (generally assumed to be the party favored by the wealthy) have taken much fuller advantage of the 
contribution refund program than Democrats in their mobilization efforts.  Rosenberg, supra note 89, at 39 – 42.
133
 Smith, supra note 65, at 112.
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raising non-PCR funds show strong relationships to his or her success at raising PCR 
donations.134  In other words, the study suggests that Minnesota PCR donations depend 
almost entirely on a candidate’s own efforts to solicit contributions rather than on the income 
level of the candidate’s supporters.  Further study of the Minnesota experience is necessary to 
clarify the effects that the refund program has had on political giving in the state.
The Minnesota PCR program was introduced to supplement a system of public 
financing that had already shown moderate success in enabling more competitive elections.  
Studies on the effects of the contribution refund on small-donor participation in Minnesota 
suggest that the refund program has had a similarly moderate, but measurable, effect on donor 
behavior.  Between 1990 and 1998, contributions of less than $100 increased from 34.3% to 
39.2% of the average candidate’s budget, with effects being particularly pronounced in open-
seat races.135  In open-seat races, contributions of less than $100 rose from 28.9% to 48.9% of 
the total receipts of Democratic-Farmer-Labor candidates, and from 30.9% to 41.3% of the 
total receipts of Republican candidates.136
Despite these measurable effects, the contribution refund program’s overall 
participation rate is still relatively low.  One study suggests that participation averages slightly 
less than 4% of potential donors during election years and slightly less than 3% during off 
years.137  Even as participation rates have remained flat, however, the amount of money paid 
out by the state through the program has increased steadily as the average size of the refund 
134 Id. at 116.  Party affiliation also plays a major role, as the Republican Party in Minnesota has been much more 
effective than the Democratic Farmer-Labor Party at mobilizing its donor base to take advantage of the 
contribution refund program.  Id. at 107 – 08.
135 See Ramsden & Donnay, supra note 115, at 38.
136 Id. at 39.
137 See Smith, supra note 65, at 97 (estimating contribution refund participation rates for the years 1994 to 1999).  
The author estimates that contribution refund participation was 3.73% in 1994, 2.86% in 1995, 4.05% in 1996, 
2.76% in 1997, 3.79% in 1998, and 2.97% in 1999.  Id.
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has increased, rising from $7.5 million in the 1996 election cycle to more than $9 million in 
the 2000 election cycle.138
Perhaps the most notable “success story” for the Minnesota PCR program – and 
indeed, for political contribution incentive programs generally – was the election of Reform 
Party candidate Jesse Ventura as Governor of Minnesota in 1998.  Governor Ventura’s 
success was widely attributed to the effectiveness of his appeal to grassroots supporters.139
The contribution refund program was instrumental to this appeal.  Even after he was 
elected governor, Ventura promoted participation in the program actively throughout his 
fundraising efforts with such slogans as “Help Fund the Governor’s Grass Roots Volunteer 
Organization and Get Your Money Back!”140  Governor Ventura argued that the contribution 
refund program was essential to his fundraising efforts because he refused to accept PAC 
donations:  “The underlying goal of the publicly funded PCR program is to make it 
unnecessary for candidates to accept large contributions from individual donors and lobbying 
groups by providing candidates with enough small contributions to adequately finance their 
campaigns.”141  Ventura’s promotion of the Minnesota contribution refund program was 
particularly prominent on his web site, where he devoted most of his main fundraising page 
and an entire additional page to the refund.142
Governor Ventura’s emphasis on PCR contributions was not simply rhetoric, as during 
his 1998 campaign he was able to raise PCR funds at a comparable rate to that of his major 
party opponents.  Ventura raised $177,658 in PCR funds in 1998, which was only slightly less 
than the $181,089 raised by Democratic candidate Skip Humphrey, and actually exceeded the 
138
 Rosenberg, supra note 89, at 38.
139 E.g., Dane Smith & Robert Whereatt, Ventura Wins; Populist Campaign Brings Out Throngs of Young 
Voters, MINN. STAR-TRIB., Nov. 4, 1998, at 1A.
140
 Rosenberg, supra  note 89, at 42 – 43.
141 Id. at 43.
142 Id.
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$175,937 raised by Republican Norm Coleman.143  This fundraising success, when combined 
with the operation of Minnesota’s other election laws such as voluntary spending limits and 
direct public funding144 – as well as access to debates145 – enabled Governor Ventura to 
overcome obstacles to competing with the major party candidates and ultimately to win his 
election.
The unique history of political contribution incentives in Oregon provides additional 
insight into ways in which lawmakers can design a more effective political contributions 
incentive program.  Oregon’s brief experience with linking its tax credit for political 
contributions to voluntary spending limits reveals some of the effects that different regulatory 
structures can have on the efficacy of political contribution incentives.  During the brief 
period when Measure 9’s low contribution limits and voluntary spending limits were both in 
effect, political contribution incentive program participation rates for the wealthiest income 
classes fell sharply, while participation rates for the two lowest income classes rose 
slightly.146  This effect suggests that, as in Minnesota, adoption of a system that combines low 
contribution limits with political contribution incentives linked to voluntary spending limits 
creates a political environment that is more open to candidates whose strength lies in 
appealing to large numbers of small donors.  Oregon’s data set is too limited to draw any 
definite conclusions– only in the 1996 election was there a high level of participation in 
Measure 9’s voluntary spending limits – but at the same time, the data are in some ways more 
143
 Peter S. Wattson, How Minnesota’s Campaign Finance Law Helped Elected a Third-Party Governor 10, 
Paper Presented at Council on Governmental Ethics Laws Annual Conference (Dec. 8, 1999), available at
http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/treatise/cogel-jesse.pdf.
144 See id. at 9 – 12 (arguing that restrictions spending limits placed on Ventura’s opponents, access to general 
account public funding available to all candidates who received over 5% of the vote, and permissive election 
laws that made it easier for minor party candidates to access the ballot and for new voters to register on election 
day were all necessary factors in Ventura’s election).
145 See Smith & Whereatt, supra note 139, at 1A (reporting that Ventura, as a “plain speaker of homespun 
wisdom,” was “by consensus, the star of most of the debates”).
146
 Smith, supra note 65, at 142 – 43.
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instructive than Minnesota’s data in that one can witness the effects of a change in the 
governing law.
Oregon has the highest participation rate in the country for a political contribution 
incentive program, and in large measure this is due to the state providing the credit for 
contributions to PACs as well as candidates and parties.147  Many PACs solicit credit-eligible 
contributions aggressively, promoting the credit as a central aspect of their fundraising 
appeal.148  The result is that in recent electoral cycles, a substantial portion of contributions on 
which a tax credit was claimed went to PACs rather than to parties or candidates.149  These 
results are consistent with data from Minnesota’s contribution refund program.  Both cases 
suggest that political contribution incentive programs are more likely to be successful in 
changing donor behavior if the backdrop of campaign finance regulations against which they 
operate also includes incentives for potential contribution recipients to promote the credit’s 
usage.  More study is needed to clarify why PACs in Oregon are so much better positioned 
than candidates and parties to solicit credit-eligible contributions.150  Clearly, however, 
Oregon’s higher participation rate is driven by the mobilization efforts of contribution 
recipients.
If the higher participation in the Oregon tax credit is largely attributable to the 
mobilization efforts of PACs, why has the Arkansas credit not shown similar effects?  Like 
Oregon, Arkansas allows PACs (including small donor PACs) to receive credit- eligible 
contributions.  Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that the Arkansas credit is the victim of 
147
 Rosenberg, supra note 89, at 29 – 32.
148 See id. at 30 – 31 (quoting literature from Oregon Right to Life and Oregon Gun Owners’ Political Victory 
Fund).
149 See id. at 29 (“Comparing tax credit data from the Oregon Department of Revenue and contribution data from 
the National Institute for Money in State Politics, it appears that the most tax credits are being claimed on 
contributions to organizations besides candidate and party campaigns.”).
150
 For a discussion of some reasons why PACs may have stronger incentives to use the tax credit to solicit 
small-dollar contributions, see infra text accompanying note 191.
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a widespread lack of awareness, even among political insiders.151  While Oregon’s tax credit 
has been around since 1969, Arkansas’ credit was only enacted in 1996.  Moreover, the 
Arkansas credit was enacted as part of a much broader initiative, most of which was struck 
down as unconstitutional by the courts.152  Indeed, the very PACs that might otherwise have 
been early supporters of the tax credit were opponents of Initiated Act 1 because it subjected 
them to low contribution limits.153  According to the author of Initiated Act 1, after large 
portions of the Act were struck down, the tax credit’s focus on small contributions was 
undermined.154  While campaign literature often refers to the credit, these references are 
mainly limited to “small print disclaimers.”155  The turbulent history surrounding the 
enactment of the Arkansas credit seems to have handicapped its early success in increasing 
the role of small donors in state and local politics.  More study of the differences between the 
Arkansas and Oregon credits and the role of PACs in Arkansas and Oregon is needed to 
clarify why PACs in Oregon have mobilized around tax credits for political contributions so
effectively.
Minnesota and Oregon have provided useful “laboratories” for examining the effects 
of political contribution incentive programs under different circumstances.156  In the next 
151 See Rosenberg, supra note 89, at 54 – 55 (“The Arkansas political establishment has not embraced or, in 
some cases, even acknowledged the credit for political contributions as a viable fundraising mechanism.”).  One 
political party leader was not even aware that the credit applied to donations to political parties.  See id. at 54 
(citing a personal interview with State Senator Percy Malone (D-Arkadelphia)).
152 See supra notes 105 – 106 and accompanying text.
153 See supra text accompanying notes 104 – 107.
154 See Rosenberg, supra note 89, at 55 (quoting Scott Trotter, former Executive Director of Common Cause 
Arkansas).
155 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
156
 Another valuable source of data on political contribution incentive programs is Canada, which offers a 75% 
tax credit for contributions to political parties.  See CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., PARTICIPATION, COMPETITION, 
ENGAGEMENT: REVIVING AND IMPROVING PUBLIC FUNDING FOR PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION POLITICS 80 – 82
(2003), available at http://www.cfinst.org/presidential/report/index.html.  Canada has offered a tax credit for 
political contributions since 1974.  Id.  In 2003, the Canadian Parliament passed legislation that raised the 
amount of the credit from $500 to $650.  An Act to Amend the Canada Elections Act and the Income Tax Act, 
ch. 19, S.C. 2003 (Can.).  Although a comprehensive comparative study of Canada’s campaign finance system is 
beyond the scope of this paper, the Campaign Finance Institute’s research suggests that Canada’s tax credit has 
significantly increased the role of small donors in funding political parties.  See CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., supra, at 
82 (finding that since the tax credit was introduced, political parties’ average contributions has generally 
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section, the state PIRGs will propose a structure for a new federal incentive program for 
political contributions that builds on this experience.
declined while the numbers of both individual contributors and claimants of the tax credit increased).  Further 
study of the Canadian experience is needed to determine what lessons Americans should draw from it.
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III. Contribution incentive programs can be part of a comprehensive, long-term 
strategy for campaign finance reform
A. Vouchers:  One Possible Future
A political contribution incentive program can only empower individuals to participate 
on equal terms in the funding of political campaigns if participation in the program is 
determined solely by individual choice, so that donors are not forced to bear opportunity costs 
that lower-income citizens will be less able to afford.  One way to construct such an ideal 
program would be to administer political contribution incentives through a voucher system.
The idea of creating a voucher system to distribute public funding to candidates is not 
new.  Senators Lee Metcalf (D-Mont.)157 and Russell Long (D-La.)158 each proposed a 
campaign finance voucher program in 1967.  Both proposals were introduced in response to 
criticism of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1966.159  That Act had 
established a tax check-off for public financing of presidential campaigns, but Congress had 
subsequently voted to delay the Act’s implementation while it considered further proposals 
for reform.160  Both voucher proposals considered in the Senate in 1967 would have retained 
the element of a tax check-off that allowed taxpayers to earmark $1 for financing political 
campaigns, but would have given individuals a more potent political contribution incentive by 
having the government send them a voucher that they could remit to the candidate of their 
choice (instead of their $1 going into a general fund for all candidates, as under conventional 
tax check-off programs).161  The voucher proposals were thus like tax check-off proposals, 
157
 Federal Elections Campaign Financing Act, S. 1390, 90th Cong. (1967).  See also DAVID W. ADAMANY & 
GEORGE E. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY: A STRATEGY FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN AMERICA 189 (1975) 
(evaluating Metcalf’s proposal).
158
 Presidential Election Campaign Assistance Act, S. 1698, 90th Cong. (1967).
159
 Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1539.
160 See Act of June 13, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-26, 81 Stat. 57; Political Campaign Financing Proposals: Hearing 
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 90th Cong. 60 – 63 (1967) [hereinafter Campaign Financing Proposals 
Hearings] (summarizing 10 proposed reforms before the Senate Finance Committee in 1967).
161 See ADAMANY & AGREE, supra note 157, at 189.
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because individuals would not have been required to lay out any of their own money up front, 
but they were also like tax credits, because individuals would have been given the power to 
choose the recipients of the funds.
The Metcalf and Long proposals differed both in scope and accessibility.  Senator 
Metcalf’s plan would have expanded both the scope and effect of the tax check-off, giving 
taxpayers the choice to receive two $1 vouchers:  one each for use in congressional and 
presidential campaigns.162  The Metcalf vouchers would not have been accessible to all 
Americans at all times, however, as they would only have been available to those taxpayers 
who had sufficient tax liability in the year preceding the election for which the voucher would 
have been issued.163
Compared to the Metcalf proposal, the Long proposal on the one hand was more 
limited in scope, but on the other hand was more progressive.  Senator Long’s bill would have 
created “Presidential Election Campaign Certificates” but made no provision for 
congressional races.164  Unlike in the Metcalf bill, however, under Senator Long’s plan the 
government would have automatically sent vouchers to all individuals who filed taxes in the 
year preceding the election, and made a voucher available to any other individual (including 
resident aliens) who requested it.165  Thus, while it applied only to presidential campaigns, 
Senator Long’s proposal was the first legislative attempt to enact political contribution 
incentives outside of the tax code, making them potentially available to all Americans.
Ultimately, however, the Senate acted on neither 1967 voucher proposal.  Some 
Senators who supported vouchers in principle raised questions about how easily they could be 
administered, and political momentum at the time was clearly behind first creating some form 
162
 S. 1390 § 2.
163 Id.  Thus, during presidential off-years only congressional vouchers would have been issued.  Id.
164
 S. 1698 § 102.
165 Id.
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of tax incentive.166   After several years of additional debate and legislative maneuvering, the 
tax credit and tax check-off each became law separately as the two titles of the Pastore 
Amendment to the Revenue Act of 1971.167
Although Congress has not considered a campaign finance voucher proposal since 
1967, the concept has remained alive in academic circles.  In their seminal 1975 text Political 
Money, David Adamany and George Agree used the Metcalf plan as a starting point for 
developing their own proposal for a voucher system that applied to both presidential and 
congressional elections.168  In recent years other proposals for using a voucher system for the 
public financing of federal elections have circulated through legal academia.169  The most 
166 See, e.g., Campaign Financing Proposals Hearings, supra note 160, at 242 – 264 (1967) (statement of Sen. 
Robert F. Kennedy (D-N.Y.)) (arguing, inter alia, that tax credits were easier to administer than the proposed 
Metcalf voucher system).  
167 See supra text accompanying notes 39 – 43.  See also 117 CONG. REC. 41,947 (1971) (statement of Sen. 
Russell B. Long (D-La.)) (arguing that the Pastore Amendment’s presidential tax check-off should be extended 
to non-taxpayers through a voucher system).
168 ADAMANY & AGREE, supra note 157, at 189 – 99.  In their discussion of voucher proposals, Adamany and 
Agree ultimately decided to modify their voucher plan so that it was no longer a true political contribution 
incentive program.  Instead of each voucher being worth a certain amount of money that would be given to the 
candidate chosen by each citizen, under the Adamany and Agree plan citizens would first donate their vouchers 
to candidates, then a complicated formula would be applied to determine how much public money each 
candidate would be given based on the number of vouchers the candidate had collected.  Id. at 196 – 99.  The 
formula’s most salient feature was a ceiling of 38% of total popular support; any percentage of total vouchers a 
candidate received above this threshold would not have resulted in additional funds.  Id. at 196 – 98.  Adamany 
and Agree adopted this formula to prevent a lopsided distribution of campaign subsidies.  With the 38% ceiling, 
even presidential candidates Barry Goldwater and George McGovern, who suffered landslide defeats to Lyndon 
Johnson and Richard Nixon, respectively, would have received the same amount of public funding as their 
opponents (assuming, somewhat questionably, that the voucher distribution would have tracked general election 
results).  Id. at 200.  Adamany and Agree argued that designing a system that would provide rough parity in 
funding among major candidates was essential to guarantee to voters “a full and fair presentation of 
alternatives.”  Id. at 190.  Adding a complicated formula for how funds are distributed, however, is directly 
contrary to the principles that support the creation of a system of political contribution incentives; political 
contribution incentives empower individual acts of participation by linking the distribution of funds directly to 
popular support.  Moreover, attempts to second guess the public by allowing it only an indirect say over how 
public funds are distributed leave open many of the same opportunities for major party entrenchment that plague 
the existing system of direct grants of public money to presidential campaigns.  See, e.g., Tax Credits Hearings, 
supra note 45, at 57 (statement of Prof. Roy Schotland, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr.) (arguing that forms of 
public funding other than political contribution incentives necessarily involve formulae for distributing the funds 
that will unfairly discriminate against some group of candidates).  See also Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons 
for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 
(1996) (arguing that “the voucher plan does a better job of both minimizing the impact of wealth on the political 
system and of empowering those individuals lacking political capital” than other forms of public financing).
169 See Hasen, supra note 168, at 29 – 44 (arguing that a voucher system would create a more equitable political 
order and that it would have a realistic chance of becoming law and passing constitutional muster); Edward B. 
Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204 
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compelling of these proposals was put forward by Yale Law Professors Bruce Ackerman and 
Ian Ayres in their recently published book, Voting With Dollars: A New Paradigm for 
Campaign Finance.170
In Voting With Dollars, Ackerman and Ayres propose to send to all registered voters 
an ATM-like “Patriot card” containing fifty “Patriot dollars” that would be transferable to the 
candidate(s) of their choice.171  Of that money, $10 would be set aside for House races, $15 
for Senate races, and $25 for the presidential race.172  Donations to parties and PACs would 
also be allowed; the authors see these political agents as “brokers” whom individuals may 
(1994) (arguing that a constitutional principle of equal-dollars-per-voter should be established – either by 
amendment or reinterpretation – that would require a closed system of campaign funds such as a voucher plan).
170 BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE
(2002).  Professor Ackerman had discussed his ideas for creating a voucher system of public financing in 
previous works, but Voting With Dollars is the first detailed elaboration of his proposal.  See Bruce Ackerman, 
The Patriot Option, BOSTON REV., Apr./May 1997, available at http://bostonreview.net/BR22.2/ackerman.html; 
Bruce Ackerman, Crediting the Voters: A New Beginning for Campaign Finance, AM. PROSPECT, Spr. 1993, at 
71.
171 ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 170.  The “new paradigm” referred to in the work’s title includes both the 
voucher proposal and a proposal that contribution limits be greatly increased but that all contributions be made 
anonymously.  See id. at 9.  The common thread between these two proposals is an analogy to the voting booth.  
In the authors’ view, the voucher system guarantees political equality among all citizens – analogous to 
constitutional principles of one person, one vote – while the anonymity rules address corruption concerns by 
creating an “anonymous donation booth” analogous to the secret ballot.  See id. at 25.  Although the authors treat 
the two aspects of their proposal as if they were crucially linked, many commentators have argued that the two 
proposals should be evaluated separately.  See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Elections and Change Under Voting With 
Dollars, 91 CAL. L. REV. 705, 705 (2003) (“If . . . Voting With Dollars . . . were an Olympic event, it would be 
the biathlon . . . [which] combines two sports that are usually quite distinct from one another . . . .”).  Moreover, 
once one defines political equality as the primary concern of campaign finance reform, measures such as 
anonymity for all private contributions that are aimed at fighting corruption become less necessary.  After all, 
bribery statutes and related laws already make actual corruption illegal.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 201 – 19 (2000) 
(defining crimes of bribery, graft, and conflicts of interest for public officials).  Although fears that the 
appearance of corruption harms the American political process are real, such fears are often exaggerated by those 
who argue that the regulation of deals between legislators and their constituents, rather than political equality, 
should be the central concern of campaign finance reform.  See infra text accompanying notes 184 – 196.  In 
defining the problem of campaign finance reform as one of political equality, this paper focuses solely on the 
voucher proposal of Professors Ackerman and Ayres while ignoring their proposed anonymity requirements.
172 ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 170, at 76 – 78.  The authors further provide that when an incumbent 
president is running for reelection, the presidential money pool must be split with $10 for the primary and $15 
for the general election; no similar provisions are made for congressional or open-seat presidential elections.  Id.
at 79 – 82.
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choose to entrust with their Patriot dollars so that they can be put to their most effective 
use.173
Ackerman and Ayres postulate that, even as market forces create more competitive 
elections by channeling Patriot dollars to where they are most in demand, the operation of the 
market will have the secondary effect of fostering a more active and engaged citizenry.  Once 
citizens are given a stake on equal terms within the Patriot voucher program, “Americans will 
be giving renewed social meaning to their self-understanding as free and equal citizens, 
engaging in democratic deliberation.”174
In contrast to proposals that would limit the total money available to candidates, 
Ackerman and Ayres predict that the net result of their proposal would be to double the total 
money available in the system.175  With such a large infusion of public money into the 
campaign system, the authors argue that their proposal will have “transformative” effects on 
campaign finance:
173 See Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, Why a New Paradigm?, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1147, 1176 – 77 (2003) 
(“The activities of these ‘Patriotic brokers’ will vastly increase the number of effective challenges to vulnerable 
incumbents.”).
174 ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 170, at 15.  Of course, under Ackerman and Ayres’ proposal citizens would 
still be on unequal terms with regard to private contributions made outside of the Patriot voucher program.  
While Ackerman and Ayres would require private contributions to be made anonymously to address corruption 
concerns, see supra note 171, they also call for raising individual contribution limits to “a stratospheric height 
that will be practically insignificant to all but the very richest Americans.”  ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 
170, at 48.  The authors are clearly relying on what they see as the “transformative” effects of the Patriot voucher 
program to address the problem of political equality, see infra note 175 and accompanying text, but combining 
the Patriot program with significantly higher contribution limits will severely undermine Patriot’s beneficial 
effects.  A political contribution incentive program can only establish meaningful equality among individual 
donors if it is combined with low contribution limits that prevent private wealth from being translated into 
disproportionate political influence.  See infra text accompanying notes 198 – 200.
175 See Ackerman & Ayres, supra note 173, at 1152 (“About $3 billion in private dollars were contributed to all 
federal candidates during the 2000 election cycle.  We predict that private giving will decline under the 
[anonymous] donation booth regime to the $1 to $2 billion range, while Patriot giving will yield approximately 
$5 billion.”).  The authors’ estimate of the amount of Patriot dollars that will actually be expended, however, is 
based on the controversial assumption that participation rates in the program will initially approximate voter 
turnout in general elections.  See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 170, at 4 – 5 (stating that if “100 million 
Americans who came to the polls in 2000 had also ‘voted’ with their patriot cards during the campaign, their 
combined contributions would have amounted to $5 billion . . . .”); id. at 31, 51 (assuming that Patriot 
participation will equal $5 billion).  Many reviewers of Voting With Dollars have argued that this estimate is 
exceedingly optimistic.  See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Mixing Metaphors: Voting, Dollars, and Campaign 
Finance Reform, 2 ELECTION L. J. 271, 274 – 76 (arguing that basing estimates of participation on presidential 
primary turnout is a more reasonable approach, one which provides a figure of $1.8 billion).
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Empirical study of the existing marketplace doesn’t provide a clue about the 
way politicians will respond to such a massive shift in the financial playing 
field.  Perhaps some will continue relying almost exclusively on private funds.  
But they will have to contend with a host of rising politicians who will learn to 
appeal to the interests of Patriot holders.176
Ackerman and Ayres also provide two additional mechanisms to guarantee that substantial 
amounts of Patriot money flow through the system in any given election.  First, Patriot dollars 
would be adjusted for inflation so that their real value does not diminish over time.177
Second, the authors would give the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) power to intervene 
in the operation of the Patriot system in the event that the overall funds available to candidates 
dipped too low or the ratio of private-to-Patriot dollars became too high.178  Ultimately, 
though, the authors feel that this emergency mechanism will not be necessary, as the Patriot 
system will create “a wave of enthusiastic citizen engagement” that over time will grow to 
exceed voter turnout rates.179
Critics of voucher systems argue that candidates must expend more effort to raise 
money from small donors, and therefore engage in excessive amounts of fundraising.180  This 
criticism is misguided, however, because it ignores important values that are served by 
bringing the small-dollar contributions of average Americans into the political process.  With 
176
 Ackerman & Ayres, supra note 173, at 1152.
177 ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 170, at 218.
178 Id. at 89 (arguing that the FEC should be empowered to exercise “swamping control” over the Patriot scheme 
so that public funds always constitute at least two-thirds of all campaign money).  Ackerman and Ayres’ 
calculation of how many Patriot dollars will be necessary to maintain their desired two-thirds ratio depends on 
both their expectations for relatively high rates of participation in the program and their assumption that the 
program’s anonymity element of their proposal will reduce private donations between one half and two thirds.  
See supra note 175.
179 Id. at 90 – 91.  Reviewing Voting With Dollars in the Election Law Journal, Professor Guy-Uriel Charles 
argues that regardless of how powerful incentives to contribute are made, “the incidence of voting will always 
surpass contributions as a form of political participation” because “voting is the highest form of participation . . . 
as both a descriptive and normative matter.”  Charles, supra note 175, at 276.  As evidence for his argument, 
Charles cited data showing the participation rate in Minnesota’s contribution refund program to be 8% for the 
2000 elections.  See id. (stating that “Minnesota’s campaign financing scheme . . . is the most analogous 
comparison to Patriot extant”).  But see ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 170, at 262 – 63 n.3 (arguing that the 
Minnesota system is far less user-friendly than Patriot).
180 See Richard Briffault, Reforming Campaign Finance Reform: A Review of Voting With Dollars, 91 CAL. L. 
REV. 643, 674 (2003) (“[T]he voucher plan both diverts a significant portion of public money into fundraising 
and will require that candidates devote a significant portion of their campaign time and effort to fundraising.”).
Toward a Small Donor Democracy:  The Past and Future of Incentive Programs for Small Political Contributions 41
fundraising linked directly to popular support through a voucher system such as Patriot (or 
even somewhat imperfectly through a well-designed tax credit program), campaigning and 
fundraising no longer have to be separate activities.  Instituting a well-funded voucher system 
as the principal means of funding campaigns181 would force candidates to appeal to large 
portions of the electorate in order to mount viable campaigns.  Exclusive black-tie dinners 
would become less effective than community barbeques.  Personal phone calls to local elites 
would become less effective than door-to-door canvassing.  To attract large numbers of 
vouchers, candidates would have to take distinctive positions that set them apart from their 
rivals and are popular with grassroots constituencies from across the political spectrum.  
Ackerman and Ayres summarize it best:  “In short, the best fundraising strategy will be 
effective political communication.”182
A campaign finance voucher system such as the one proposed by Professors 
Ackerman and Ayres would provide the most potent form of political contribution incentive 
program.  All Americans, regardless of their tax status or their income level, would receive an 
equal opportunity to participate in the voucher program alongside their fellow citizens.  As 
Ackerman and Ayres suggest, such a program would have the potential to change the face of 
American politics by empowering average Americans to become small donors.  Past 
experience with political contribution incentive programs suggests, however, that such 
programs are only effective when the potential recipients of political contributions have an 
incentive to use the program to solicit contributions and when the public has been educated 
about the existence of the program.
181 See supra note 175.
182
 Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, The New Paradigm Revisited, 91 CAL. L. REV. 743, 753 (2003).
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B. Opening incentive programs to candidates, parties, and PACs will encourage 
maximum participation from small donors
One way to increase participation in a political contribution incentive program is to 
provide the incentive for contributions to a broad range of political agents, especially those 
who have a high demand for small-dollar contributions.  As front-line participants in electoral 
contests, candidates are the most obvious beneficiaries of the program, but parties have a 
strong claim as well.  Contributions to political parties are qualitatively different from 
contributions to candidates.  Parties are generally in a much better position than individual 
donors to know where contributions will be used to the greatest competitive effect, giving 
parties an important role in promoting competitive elections.183  Moreover, parties have more 
of a long-term interest than candidates in developing a base of small donors who regularly 
participate in the funding of campaigns.  As repeat players in the political market, parties 
benefit much more from the associative value of receiving small contributions from donors 
who come to feel that they are among the “party faithful.”
It is not likely a coincidence that Oregon’s tax credit for political contributions has the 
highest participation rate of any political contribution incentive program in the country and 
that it includes both state and federal entities, including PACs, in its coverage.184   Some 
campaign finance reform advocates wrongly point to PACs as a principal problem with the 
current federal campaign finance system because PACs engage in “bundling.”185  A 
“bundler,” who may represent a PAC or be an individual fundraiser, solicits contributions on 
183 See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is Deeply Rooted, 18 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 350 – 54 (1989) (arguing that parties should be the primary mechanism for allocating 
public campaign funds).  Lowenstein also argues, inter alia, for low individual contribution limits for candidates, 
parties, and PACs.  Id. at 357 – 59.
184 See supra text accompanying notes 90 – 98.
185 See, e.g., Jim Motavalli, Chasing the Money: Everyone Talks About Campaign Finance Reform, But 
Grassroots Groups Are Making It Happen, E, Sept.-Oct. 1996 (quoting Ellen Miller, executive director of the 
Center for Responsive Politics, arguing that low contribution limits are ineffective reforms because “they don’t 
deal with the bundling issue”), available at http://www.emagazine.com/september-
october_1996/0996feat12.html.
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behalf of a candidate or party and arranges that they be delivered in a way that identifies the 
entire “bundle” of contributions with the bundler who solicited them.186  According to the 
critics of bundling, PACs are able to use this practice to win disproportionate influence for the 
“special interests” that they represent.187  This same school of thought led some reformers to 
oppose the McHugh Amendment, which would have strengthened the federal tax credit for 
political contributions in the 1986 TRA instead of repealing it; critics of bundling argued that 
expanding the federal tax credit for political contributions would only subsidize this 
practice.188  These opponents of including PACs in a political contribution incentive program 
would likely point to the experience in Oregon to make their case.  PACs have become the 
primary beneficiaries of Oregon’s tax credit, such that most credit claims received by the state 
are made on contributions to “special interests.”189
There are several problems with this analysis.  First, the predominant role of PACs in 
taking advantage of the tax credit must be understood in tandem with another crucial aspect of 
Oregon’s campaign finance laws:  the lack of any limits on individual contributions to 
candidates.  In the absence of regulatory incentives that compel candidates to solicit small-
dollar contributions by promoting the use of the tax credit, credit-subsidized contributions to 
186
 Traditionally, a bundler had to gather physically the checks of a group of individual donors and deliver them 
together in order to get “credit” from the recipient for his or her bundling.  In 1999, however, campaign 
operatives for then-Governor George W. Bush developed a system of virtual bundling whereby individual 
fundraisers were assigned tracking numbers that contributors could write on their checks to identify the 
fundraiser who had successfully solicited their contribution.  CHARLES LEWIS & THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC 
INTEGRITY, THE BUYING OF THE PRESIDENT 2004 8 (2004).  Using these tracking numbers, the Bush campaign 
gave the honorary title of “Pioneer” to fundraisers who raised over $100,000 for the campaign; in 2004, the 
campaign added the title of “Ranger” for fundraisers who raised over $200,000.  See id. at 8 – 9 (“What is 
unusual about the Pioneer system is the unabashed directness of the transaction:  You help us and we’ll credit 
you and remember your loyalty and support later. . . .  [S]uch exceptionally well organized bundling violates the 
spirit of limiting the size of contributions . . . .”).
187 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth, BOSTON REV., Dec. 1997/Jan. 1998 (stating that 
“two of the biggest influence abuses” in campaign finance are “PAC bundling and soft money”), available at
http://www.bostonreview.net/BR22.6/ayres.html.
188 See supra text accompanying note 71.
189 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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candidates are likely to take place at a low rate.190  PACs, on the other hand, tend to be issue-
oriented or otherwise more narrowly focused in their fundraising appeals than candidates; as 
such, many depend on small- dollar contributions for their existence and are likely to have 
much stronger incentives to organize a fundraising campaign around political contribution 
incentives.191  Thus, the disproportionate benefits derived by PACs from Oregon’s tax credit 
are likely explained in large part by the incentive structures created by the state’s campaign 
finance laws, rather than anything inherent in the credit’s coverage of contributions to PACs.
More importantly, tailoring campaign finance regulations toward minimizing the 
influence of PACs “solves” the wrong problem.  “Special interest” PACs are perceived to be a 
problem to the extent that they are able to gain disproportionate influence over legislative 
outcomes in ways that distort the political process.  PACs that have an intense interest in 
legislative outcomes on particular issues can use their resources to conduct carefully targeted 
advocacy to lobby candidates on the merits of legislative proposals, with the promise to 
support those candidates whose positions align with their own.192  The perception that PAC 
influence is in itself undesirable rests on the flawed assumption that there is something 
inherently wrong with legislative deal-making between representatives and their constituents.  
In singling out the deal-making aspect as the problem, this assumption focuses on concerns 
over quid pro quo corruption while ignoring the real problem, which is the political inequality 
190 See, e.g., supra note 133 and accompanying text.  
191
 Really, it depends on the PAC.  Some PACs are financed almost entirely by small donations, while others 
receive substantial amounts of money from large contributions by wealthy donors.  See, e.g., Press Release, 
Oregon Follow the Money Money in Politics Research Action Project, Heavy Hitters on Opposite Sides of the 
Tax Credits Debate Collect Cash from Mirror-Image Donors (Aug. 8, 2003) (comparing the contribution profiles 
of two major Oregon PACs), available at http:// www.oregonfollowthemoney.org/Press/aug0803.pdf.  The 
Oregon Education Association’s People for Improvement of Education PAC raised 99.4% of its contributions in 
amounts of $200 or less from an estimated 18,107 contributors.  Id.  The Associated Oregon Industries’ Center 
for Citizen Leadership PAC raised 97.9% of its contributions in amounts of $1000 or more from an estimated 47 
contributors.  Id.
192 See Lowenstein, supra note 183, at 309 (arguing that it is rational for issue-oriented PACs seeking particular 
legislative outcomes to give contributions to more candidates than those who agree completely with their 
position, “[s]ince the legislative strategist is interested in the change that the group’s contribution may induce in 
the candidate’s policy views, rather than in the absolute location of those views”). 
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that results when political actors of any kind are able to turn large sums of private wealth into 
legislative influence.193
A deal made between a legislator and a PAC – i.e., that the PAC gives the legislator 
contributions that encourage him or her to look out for its interests on particular issues –
should only raise concerns to the extent that those Americans with significant private wealth 
are able to use their wealth as a means of exercising disproportionate influence over the 
political process.  The real concern should thus be political equality, not corruption or its 
appearance.  The problem with PAC contributions is the same as the problem with other 
forms of hard money.  Individual contribution limits to PACs are currently set at $5,000,194
which is a level of political spending far beyond the means of all but the wealthiest 
Americans.  High contribution limits functionally guarantee that only a narrow segment of the 
population is able to play a meaningful role in the funding of campaigns.195
Legislative deal-making would not be cause for concern if all citizens had an equal 
opportunity to influence the legislative process.  A comparison to voting is instructive here.  
Candidates make deals with particular groups of constituents all the time in return for their 
votes.  This sort of deal-making is not seen as illegitimate, however, because all citizens have 
a right to vote on equal terms.  When a PAC is able to wield disproportionate influence on the 
legislative process, the deal itself is not the issue; on the contrary, the real issue is that the 
PAC is able to bring its disproportionate access to private wealth to bear in the first place.
193
 For a discussion of this argument in the context of proposals for a voucher system of public financing, see 
David A. Strauss, What’s the Problem? Ackerman and Ayres on Campaign Finance Reform, 91 CAL. L. REV.
723, 732 – 33 (2003) (“If quid pro quo deals are a problem only because people with more resources will get 
unfair advantages, then the real issue is inequality, not the deals themselves.”).
194 See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A) (2000).
195
 U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, supra note 2, at 17 (“According to a nationwide survey funded by the Joyce 
Foundation during the 1996 congressional elections, 81% of those who gave contributions of at least $200 
reported annual family incomes greater than $100,000. This stood in stark contrast to the general population at 
the time, where only 4.6% declared an income of more than $100,000 on their tax returns.” (citing JOHN GREEN, 
ET AL., INDIVIDUAL CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTORS: WEALTHY, CONSERVATIVE AND REFORM-
MINDED (1998))).
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When groups of citizens join together to advocate on an issue about which they care 
deeply, they are engaging in an activity that is fundamental to the democratic process.  PACs 
such as the Sierra Club and the NRA represent groups of citizens who care about particular 
issues intensely enough that they are willing to donate money to see that their views on those 
issues are given a full hearing in the public discourse.  Indeed, this kind of political 
association is precisely the kind of intermediate organization that theorists of American 
democracy have long argued is necessary for individual citizens to overcome collective action 
problems and organize according to communities of interest.196
Political contribution incentives do not negate the ability of PACs under a system of 
high contribution limits to turn private wealth into legislative influence.  So long as incentive 
programs are narrowly tailored so that their funds are only available to those who make small 
contributions, however, their effect will likely be to raise the percentage of campaign funds 
that come from small donors.  This will make PACs that rely primarily on small contributions 
more viable and also bolster the influence of small donors within PACs of all kinds.
C. Incentive programs should be combined with additional reforms that make small 
contributions a central part of funding campaigns
The effectiveness of a political contribution incentive program can only be understood 
when considered as part of the larger system of campaign finance law within which it 
operates.  In Minnesota, candidates have an incentive to seek out small donors because the 
contribution refund program operates as part of a system that includes moderately lower 
contribution limits than the federal system and also provides candidates of established parties 
196 See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 193 – 94 (George Lawrence trans., Perennial 
2000) (1848) (stating that in America citizens organize into political associations “to show their numbers and to 
lessen the moral authority of the majority, and . . . by stimulating competition, to discover the arguments most 
likely to make an impression on the majority, for they always hope to draw the majority over to their side”).
Toward a Small Donor Democracy:  The Past and Future of Incentive Programs for Small Political Contributions 47
with direct grants of public funding linked to voluntary spending limits.197  A focus on raising 
money from small donors is likely to have significant secondary benefits for a candidate’s 
campaign.  Unlike appeals to wealthy donors, who represent only a tiny percentage of the 
electorate, candidates who are able to rely on small-dollar contributions are free to appeal to 
the people for votes and contributions simultaneously.  Freed from the demands of large-
dollar fundraising, a candidate’s entire style of campaigning is likely to be different.  Instead 
of attending exclusive fundraisers and making telephone calls to wealthy donors, a candidate 
will have time for more direct communication with average Americans through such activities 
as neighborhood barbeques and door-to-door canvassing.  Establishing policies that will 
engender a widespread switch to this style of campaigning, however, will require far-reaching 
reforms that go well beyond the enactment of political contribution incentives.
Relying on candidates and other political agents to promote a political contribution 
incentive program would be the most efficient approach, because these actors have the most 
to gain from promoting the tax credit or voucher program’s usage.  As experience with state 
programs shows, however, candidates and political agents will only promote the program to 
the extent that the campaign finance laws are structured so that they have an incentive to seek 
out small contributions.  Because the old federal tax credit operated under the rubric of the 
Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”),198 little such incentive existed for contribution 
recipients.  During the years the tax credit was in effect, FECA set individual contribution 
197 See supra text accompanying notes 113 – 122.
198
 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 
431 – 455).  The original FECA legislation was passed in the same Congress as the creation of the tax credit for 
political contributions.  Supporters of the Pastore Amendment saw well-funded methods of public financing, 
both direct and indirect, as a necessary complement to the limits that FECA placed on contributions and, before 
they were struck down as unconstitutional, expenditures.  E.g., 117 CONG. REC. 41,762 (1971) (statement of Sen. 
Pastore).
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limits to candidates at $1,000 (or $2,000 for joint returns).199  Meanwhile, even at their most 
generous, the tax credits only reimbursed individuals for 50% of their first $100 of 
contributions.  In the absence of low contribution limits or a system of public funding that 
counterbalances the impact of large contributions, FECA resulted in a political fundraising 
“arms race,” with candidates compelled to raise as many large-dollar contributions as possible 
in order to compete with their opponents.200  Those donors who were already giving anyway 
were in the best position to take advantage of the credit, and the credit contained no 
mechanism to encourage candidates to target small donors with their solicitations.
Enacting additional reforms along with a new political contribution incentive program 
could help stem the “arms race” effect of current law and give candidates and other political 
actors greater incentive to focus their attentions on average Americans.  Lowering 
contribution limits to levels that average Americans can afford would give those citizens an 
opportunity to participate in the financing of campaigns on an equal footing with the small 
percentage of Americans who are able to give large donations.201  Providing public financing 
in forms other than political contribution incentives (and other than the current system of 
199 E.g., 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1982). With the recent passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, contribution 
limits have been raised to $2,000 (or $4,000 for joint returns). Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. 
L. No. 107-155, § 307, 116 Stat. 81, 102 – 03 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a).
200 See Constitution and Campaign Reform: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Rules and Administration, 
106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Derek Cressman, U.S. PIRG) [hereinafter “Cressman Testimony”] (arguing 
that low contribution limits allow candidates to spend less time coddling individual donors and more time 
competing in the marketplace of ideas), available at
http://pirg.org/democracy/democracy.asp?id2=5999&id3=CFR& (last visited August 14, 2004).  The “arms 
race” effect of high contribution limits was compounded by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s doubling of 
individual contribution limits to candidates.  U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, supra note 2, at 36.  In the 2002 
congressional elections, 94% of candidates who raised the most money won their elections.  Id. at 14.  55.5% of 
individual contributions to candidates came in at or above $1,000.  Id. at 16.  While it is impossible to know 
exactly how many donors who previously gave the maximum will now increase their giving up to the new limit 
of $2,000, the higher individual contribution limits are likely to increase the proportion of campaign funds that 
come from large-dollar contributions.  See Clyde Wilcox & John Green, et al., Raising the Limits, PUB. 
PERSPECTIVE, May-June 2002, at 11 (finding that “‘increased giving is likely to exacerbate the upper status 
character of the donor pool’”).
201 See, e.g., Cressman Testimony, supra note 200 (citing evidence that in states which adopted low contribution 
limits in the 1990’s, the total amount of funds raised by candidates declined only slightly, while small donor 
participation increased to make up for most of the money lost through elimination of large contributions).  
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partial public funding available to presidential candidates202) would create additional 
opportunities for grassroots-driven campaigns.  George Washington University Law School 
Professor Spencer Overton has proposed that a tax credit for political contributions be linked 
to matching funds that enhance the value of small contributions at a 4-to-1 rate.203   Another 
approach to reform would link political contribution incentives and other forms of public 
funding to voluntary spending limits that would directly limit a candidate’s ability to engage 
in the campaign finance “arms race” if he or she wanted to receive public funds.204
As a practical matter, efforts to enact wholesale reforms such as these will likely 
require extended legislative battles spanning multiple congressional sessions.  The next 
section discusses how enacting a federal tax credit for political contributions could be a useful 
incremental step toward greater reforms.
202 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001 – 9042 (2000) (providing a voluntary system of matching funds for primary election 
campaigns and a block grant for general election campaigns, each of which are linked to spending limits).
203
 Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 152 U. PENN. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2004).  Like the state PIRGs, Professor Overton proposes that the tax credit be available for 
contributions of $100 or less, so that under his program “if a contributor gives $100 to a candidate, the candidate
would receive another $400 in public funds, producing a total contribution worth $500 to the candidate.”  Id.
204
 Voluntary spending limits are a central element of Minnesota’s campaign finance system.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 113 – 122.  If campaign expenditure limits are not voluntary, they may run afoul of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo, which struck down expenditure limits in the Federal Election 
Campaign Act because the Court held that they were not narrowly tailored to further the government’s 
compelling interest in eliminating corruption.  424 U.S. 1, 45 – 59 (1976).  In August 2004, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that campaign expenditure limits enacted in Vermont would be constitutional under 
Buckley’s strict scrutiny if they are found to be the least restrictive means of furthering the state’s compelling 
interests in “safeguarding Vermont’s democratic process from (1) the corruptive influence of excessive and 
unbridled fundraising and (2) the effect that perpetual fundraising has on the time has on the time of candidates 
and elected officials.”  Landell v. Sorrell, No. 00-9159, slip op. at 7 (2d Cir. Aug. 18, 2004).  Voluntary 
expenditure limits, which further the same interests, would not face the same strict scrutiny because the 
government has greater power to attach voluntary conditions to the receipt of government funds than it does to 
regulate primary conduct.  See VanNatta v. Keisling, 931 P.2d 770, 789 (Or. 1997) (“The legislative choice to 
encourage certain behavior by tax policy violates no right of any potential recipient of contributions, because the 
recipient had no constitutional right to the contributions-with-tax-credits in the first place.”).  See also Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 n.65 (1976) (upholding presidential public financing scheme’s voluntary spending limits); 
Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1550 – 51 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding Minnesota’s linkage of public 
funding to acceptance of spending limits).
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IV. A well-designed federal tax credit for political contributions would be a first step 
toward achieving more comprehensive reforms
Yale Law Professors Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres argue that a well-funded 
campaign voucher program is qualitatively superior to imperfect versions of political 
contribution incentives because it would reconstitute campaign finance under a whole new 
paradigm and in so doing transform American politics.205  The professors are betting that 
making a radical change in the system will empower individuals to participate in new and 
meaningful ways.  The original supporters of a federal tax credit for political contributions 
had similarly high hopes that their programs would foster widespread citizen participation in 
campaign fundraising.206  As with tax credits, the biggest problem with vouchers is 
uncertainty over the practical effects they will have on campaigns once they are enacted.207
Because vouchers are a much more dramatic and expensive undertaking than tax credits, it 
will be difficult to convince legislators to enact such a proposal without some preliminary 
evidence that it will actually work.  Tax credits are an intermediate step between no public 
subsidies for campaigns and a fully-funded voucher system.  If a tax credit is put into place 
and enjoys at least modest success, a powerful argument could then be made that the program 
should be taken out of the tax code and expanded into a voucher system, which would provide 
political contribution incentives that are more potent and available to more people.  
A. Properly structuring a tax credit will increase its effectiveness
For a tax credit program to further the long-term goals of the campaign finance reform 
movement, it must be structured so that it is effective even in the absence of wholesale 
reform.  The credit must be potent enough to provide a significant incentive to its 
205 See supra text accompanying notes 171 – 179.
206 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 33.
207 See Briffault, supra note 180, at 673 (arguing that with candidates’ funding entirely dependent on voters 
casting their vouchers, “challengers and political newcomers” will face “uncertainty . . . [that] may discourage 
some candidates from entering races and thus diminish electoral competitiveness”).
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beneficiaries to promote it to potential donors.  As with other political contribution incentive 
programs, the credit should be available to a broad range of political agents, including 
candidates, parties, and PACs.  The credit should be narrowly tailored so that it is only 
available for small contributions.  Finally, the enactment of the credit should be accompanied 
by independent public education efforts to encourage the credit’s use as part of a larger civic 
strategy of encouraging small donor participation in politics.
1. Offering a 100% tax credit that is both significant in size and available only for 
small contributions will provide a potent incentive targeted toward small donors
For any political contribution incentive program to further its underlying purposes, it 
must provide an incentive of a large enough size that it can have a significant aggregate
impact on election campaigns.  One criticism of the old federal tax credit was that its amount 
was so small that its benefits were not even worth the administrative and monitoring costs to 
the IRS to enforce it.208  If the federal government is to create a new tax credit for political 
contributions and expect it to have an impact on political fundraising, then the credit cannot 
be for a token amount.209  As the object of the credit is to encourage grassroots campaigns that 
appeal to small donors, however, the credit should have an upper limit that is within the reach 
of average Americans.210  A credit that applies to an individual’s first $100 of contributions, 
or $200 for joint returns, would best strike this balance.
A 100% credit will maximize the incentive value to prospective donors.211 Even some 
critics of the old federal tax credit claimed that a more potent tax incentive would have given 
208 See supra text accompanying note 66.
209 See Rosenberg, supra note 89, at 16 (calling for a credit of $200 per person, or $400 for joint returns).
210
 Indeed, one reason Congress initially created such a small tax credit was so that it would provide a significant 
incentive only for contributors who would otherwise be unable to afford to give.  See supra note 44 and
accompanying text.
211 See Rosenberg, supra note 89, at 16 (calling for a 100% credit).
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candidates sufficient incentive to mobilize small donors.212  A full credit is the most effective 
tool for candidates to use in their solicitation efforts, where they are able to promise 
prospective small donors that they will get all of their money back.
The best way for Congress to enact a new federal tax credit for political contributions 
would be to combine it with low contribution limits for the same amount.213  Under this 
system, every American would have an incentive to give at a level that most Americans could 
afford, and no American would be able to give more and thus wield disproportionate 
influence simply because he or she had a greater ability to give.
As a practical matter, however, Congress may only enact a tax credit without also 
lowering the limits on all individual contributions.  Even if the tax credit for political 
contributions is forced to stand on its own, Congress can still target the tax credit more closely 
toward small donors by making it claimable only for small contributions.  For a donor to be 
eligible for the tax credit, his or her total contributions in the given election cycle to the 
candidate, party, or PAC to which he or she claims to have made credit-eligible contributions 
should not exceed the maximum amount of the credit.214  This provision is the most effective 
way to target the tax credit at small donors, because it focuses directly on whether the credit is 
being claimed for small contributions rather than trying to discriminate among the donors 
themselves.  Moreover, this limitation will no doubt make the tax credit proposal much less 
costly, preventing those who are already giving large-dollar donations from subsidizing them 
with the credit. Evaluating the effect that limiting the tax credit to small donors would have 
on both participation and cost is an important area in which further study is needed.
212 E.g., Tax Credits Hearings, supra note 45, at 79 (statement of George E. Agree, Chairman, Comm. for the 
Dem. Process).
213 See Cressman Testimony, supra note 200 (arguing that low contribution limits allow candidates to spend less 
time soliciting contributions from individual donors and more time running issue-driven campaigns, leading to 
substantial increases in small donor participation).
214
 This provision would necessarily be enforced largely through voluntary reporting, as are most aspects of our 
tax code.
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2. Like other incentive programs, the tax credit should be provided for 
contributions to candidates, parties, and PACs
In order for a tax credit for political contributions to encourage as many small donors 
to contribute to campaigns as possible, the credit should be available for contributions to
candidates, parties, and PACs.  As experience with Oregon’s tax credit demonstrates, smaller 
issue-oriented PACs may have a much greater incentive to organize small donors to take 
advantage of the credit.215  Although these PACs are frequently derided as “special interests,” 
their political activity is just as fundamental to American democracy as that of any other 
political actor.216  The tax credit for political contributions could thus play an important role 
in encouraging PACs to bring small donors into the political process who might not otherwise 
participate.
3. Public education efforts are necessary to inform the public of the credit’s 
existence
Simply passing a tax credit or other contribution incentive program will not magically 
bring large numbers of non-participants into the political fundraising process.  As a threshold 
matter, members of the public must know that the program exists and how to take advantage 
of it.  Even in states with well-established tax credit programs, there has never been a 
widespread, non-partisan effort to educate the public about the programs.  In Minnesota, 
where the contribution refund program is considered a success, a recent study suggested that 
public education efforts would raise the program’s participation rate even further.217  A more 
detailed survey performed by the Campaign Finance Institute in 2002 found that only 27% of 
215 See supra text accompanying notes 149, 191.
216 See supra text accompanying notes 190 – 196.
217
 Ramsden & Donnay, supra note 115, at 39.
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Ohioans were aware of their state’s tax credit for political contributions,218 though it had at 
the time been in existence for eight years.219  More than 20% of those surveyed said that they 
would have been more likely to give if they had known about the tax credit.220  The Campaign 
Finance Institute is also in the process of conducting a field experiment to test whether a 
public information campaign could lead to additional contributions to campaigns.  The 
Institute mailed non-partisan brochures explaining the tax credit for political contributions to 
a random sample of Ohioans and will publish findings on the extent to which this mailing 
resulted in additional citizen participation in the tax credit program.221  Additional research is 
needed in other states and with other forms of public education. 
A new federal tax credit for political contributions should be accompanied by public 
education efforts in order to build awareness and counteract incentives within the current 
federal system of campaign finance law that focus candidates’ solicitation efforts away from 
small political contributions.  Even though the proposed new credit is more potent in various 
ways than the old credit, it would still have to operate in a system of high contribution limits 
similar to the system that existed at the time of the original federal tax credit.222  As occurred 
with the original federal tax credit, candidates would have a limited incentive to use the credit 
to solicit contributions from small donors when the law allows them to solicit large 
contributions from wealthy donors instead.223  Indeed, a candidate’s incentive to solicit from 
small donors is even further reduced following the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act, which increased the amount that an individual is allowed to contribute to a 
218 ROBERT G. BOATRIGHT & MICHAEL J. MALBIN, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., POLITICAL CONTRIBUTION TAX 
CREDITS AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 12 (2003).
219 Id. at 10.
220 Id. at 28.  4.7% said that they would have been “very likely” to give, while 17.5% said that they would have 
been “somewhat likely” to give.  Id.
221 Id. at 23.
222 See supra text accompanying notes 198 – 200.
223 See id.
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candidate from $1,000 to $2,000 per election.224  If the object of a new federal tax credit for 
political contributions is to increase the involvement of small donors in American politics, 
Congress cannot simply rely on candidates, parties and PACs to promote the credit and 
inform the public of its existence if other aspects of campaign finance law give them little 
incentive to do so.  In the absence of congressional consensus to adopt wholesale reforms of 
the campaign finance laws, any legislation that proposes a new tax credit for public 
contributions should include a special earmark to the IRS to publicize the credit.
B. A new federal tax credit for political contributions will be a direct investment in a 
healthier democracy with only modest costs
The fundamental objection of members of Congress who voted in 1986 to repeal the 
tax credit for political contributions was that its benefits did not outweigh its costs.225  In its 
peak year of 1980, when 7.2% of eligible filers took advantage of the tax credit for political 
contributions, the program’s total cost was only $269.8 million.226  The American Enterprise 
Institute has estimated that a new federal tax credit for political contributions to candidates 
and parties would cost less than $1 billion per year.227  Further study is needed of the costs of 
224
 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 307, 116 Stat. 81, 102 – 03 (to be codified 
at 2 U.S.C. § 441a).
225 SEN. RPT. 99-313 (1986).
226 See supra text accompanying note 51.  At that time, the political contributions credit was only a 50% tax 
credit for the first $50 of an individual’s contributions ($100 for joint returns).  See supra text accompanying 
notes 24 – 26.
227
 Rosenberg, supra note 89, at 19, 66 – 67.  The American Enterprise Institute estimated the costs of four 
alternative designs for a tax credit. Id. at 66 – 67.  The Institute estimates that a 100% tax credit of $200 for 
individual and $400 for joint returns, with an income cap of $100,000 (i.e., no taxpayer could claim the credit 
whose income exceeded $100,000), would cost $998.4 million in the fourth year after it was enacted.  Id. at 66.  
The Institute estimates that the same credit with an income cap of $50,000 would cost $529.9 million in the 
fourth year.  Id. at 67.  If the amount of the credit is reduced to $100 for individual and $200 for joint returns, the 
Institute estimates that the credit would cost $499.2 million in its fourth year with an income cap of $100,000 
and $265 million in its fourth year with an income cap of $50,000.  Id.  The state PIRGs recommend a 100% tax 
credit of $100 for individual and $200 for joint returns, with eligibility for the credit limited to contributions that 
do not exceed those amounts.  See supra text accompanying notes 208 – 224.  The state PIRGs recommend 
limiting the tax credit to small-dollar contributions rather than establishing an income cap in order to target the 
incentive directly toward encouraging small political contributions of all kinds rather than arbitrarily targeting 
the incentive toward contributors who have a particular income in a given year.  See supra text accompanying 
note 214.  Unlike the American Enterprise Institute, the state PIRGs recommend extend the eligibility of the tax 
credit to PACs.  See supra text accompanying notes 215 – 216.
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a new federal tax credit for political contributions.  Nevertheless, even if the tax credit were to 
cost a full $1 billion, it would still be less than one twentieth of one percent of the federal 
government’s expenditures in 2003.228  Compared to the $39 billion that the federal 
government spent on tax credits in 2002,229 these preliminary estimates suggest that the credit 
would involve relatively modest new expenditures of federal funds.
Moreover, structuring a new federal tax credit in ways that have proven successful in 
the states will strengthen the credit program and make it a more cost-effective investment in 
our democracy.  Narrowly tailoring the tax credit so that it provides a direct incentive to small 
donors to participate should result in a measurable increase in small contributions to political 
campaigns.  A new federal tax credit for political contributions will also facilitate candidates’ 
use of the Internet to mobilize the donations and support of grassroots constituencies from 
across the political spectrum.  If and when political contribution incentive programs are 
proven to work, the debate can then shift to their potential value to society.  By enabling more 
small donors to participate in funding campaigns, a new federal tax credit for political 
contributions will increase the voice of average Americans in deciding which candidates are
able to run viable campaigns for elected office.  
Increasing the role of small donors in funding campaigns will force candidates, 
parties, and PACs to articulate political agendas that have a greater appeal to average 
Americans.  In its 2002 Ohio survey, the Campaign Finance Institute found that the more than 
20% of respondents who said that a tax credit would make them more likely to make a 
political contribution were closer to the general public in age, income, political affiliation and 
other characteristics than were the 3.9% who identified themselves as current campaign 
228 See CONG. BUDGET OFF., CBO’S CURRENT BUDGET PROJECTIONS, at 
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=1944&sequence=0 (last visited July 1, 2004) (reporting that the federal 
government spent $2.158 trillion in fiscal year 2003).
229 See supra text accompanying note 86.
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contributors.230  Political contribution incentive programs make a small donor’s willingness to 
make a political contribution less dependent on his or her financial ability to make that 
contribution.231 By bringing small donors into the campaign finance system who would 
otherwise be unable to participate in the “wealth primary,” a tax credit for political 
contributions would empower small donors to play a more meaningful, substantive role at the 
early stage when crucial decisions are made concerning which candidates choose to run for 
office and whether or not those candidates are able to run viable campaigns.
A well-designed federal tax credit for political contributions could play an important 
role in encouraging new donors to participate in the funding of campaigns.  The Campaign 
Finance Institute’s 2002 Ohio survey indicated that those most receptive to becoming new 
donors in response to a tax credit were young adults who did not already have strongly 
formed political beliefs.232  As political participation is significantly influenced by habits 
formed early in life, political contribution incentive programs could create a “ripple effect” 
that promotes progressively greater levels of citizen participation over time.233  While a new 
federal tax credit for political contributions would not likely lead to a sharp increase in the 
number of campaign contributors, a well-designed program could have significant cumulative 
effects over a period of years.  As more and more donors develop a sense of ownership over 
their democracy, public interest and civic engagement are likely to increase.
A new federal tax credit for political contributions also could help encourage a new 
and promising trend in American politics:  using the Internet as a tool for generating small 
230 BOATRIGHT & MALBIN, supra note 218, at 13 – 15.  The 3.9% figure is likely to be an exaggerated number.  
Data from the Ohio Secretary of State suggests that only 0.6% of Ohioans gave contributions to state candidates 
in 2002.  Id. at 10 n.9.
231 See Smith, supra note 65, at 119 – 55 (arguing that political contribution incentives programs weaken the 
correlation between an individual’s income and the likelihood that he or she will make a political contribution).
232 Id. at 22.
233 Id. at 3.
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contributions and encouraging citizen participation in grassroots campaigns.234  This 
phenomenon became prominent during the race for the 2004 Democratic presidential 
nomination.  Presidential candidates’ historical dependence on wealthy donors largely 
remained true in the 2004 Democratic primary campaign.235  Two relative political outsiders 
bucked this trend, however, and enjoyed surprising success using the Internet to attract small-
dollar contributions and organize grassroots supporters.  The Internet activities of these 
candidates – former Vermont Governor Howard Dean and General Wesley Clark – made 
them surprisingly strong contenders in the months before the 2004 primary season.  Though 
the campaigns of both candidates fizzled during the primaries themselves, their use of the 
Internet enabled them to emerge from the “wealth primary” as viable candidates with 
legitimate chances to win their party’s nomination.236
During the 2004 Democratic presidential primary campaign, the ten major candidates 
raised a total of $160.6 million in individual contributions through March 1, 2004.237  Of this 
234
 It is important to note, however, that the Internet is not a panacea – it is simply a new tool for facilitating 
political communication and participation.  Because wealthy, white, well-educated Americans have a 
disproportionate amount of access to the Internet and make disproportionate use of it, the Internet is unlikely to 
overcome existing political inequality within American society on its own.  AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N TASK FORCE 
ON INEQUALITY & AM. DEMOCRACY, supra note 20, at 8.  Moreover, because of the Internet’s decentralization 
and sheer size, those who are not already politically attuned are unlikely to be drawn into political involvement 
simply because the Internet is available to them.  See id. at 8 (“In short, the Internet may ‘activate the active’ and 
widen the disparities between participants and the politically disengaged by making it easier for the already 
engaged to gain political information, to make political connections, and [to] contribute money.”).
235
 Here, the “2004 Democratic primary campaign” includes both 2003 pre-primary campaign fundraising and 
electioneering (i.e., the period in which the wealth primary takes place, see supra text accompanying notes 16 –
21) and the contested primary season, which ended on March 2, 2004 when Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.) 
became the de facto Democratic presidential nominee following victories in nine of ten “Super Tuesday” 
primaries.  Adam Nagourney, Kerry in Big Victories Across the Nation; Edwards Will Quit Race, an Aide Says, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2004, at A1.  The Democratic campaign fundraising data reported here represents totals as 
of February 29, 2004.
236 See Susan Page & Richard Benedetto, Clark Closes in on Dean in Poll, USA TODAY, Jan. 7, 2004, at 1A 
(reporting that in national polls taken two weeks before the Iowa Caucuses, Dean led all Democratic presidential 
candidates with 24%, but Clark was gaining ground and came in second with 21%).  The race for the nomination 
changed dramatically, however, when Senator Kerry pulled off a dramatic come-from-behind victory in the Iowa 
Caucuses.  See Adam Nagourney & Edward Wyatt, After Iowa, New Hampshire Just Doesn't Look the Same, 
Jan. 21, 2004, at A22 (reporting that Kerry’s victory in Iowa derailed Dean’s nomination strategy and 
undermined Clark’s plan to skip Iowa and focus on New Hampshire).
237 CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., 2004 PRESIDENTIAL FUNDRAISING FROM INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS AS OF FEBRUARY 
29, 2004 [hereinafter 2004 PRESIDENTIAL FUNDRAISING], at http://www.cfinst.org/pr/pdf/Table1_Feb.pdf (last 
visited June 24, 2004).  The ten major candidates for the 2004 Democratic presidential nomination were General 
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money, 49% came through contributions in amounts of $1,000 or more, while only 32% came 
through contributions in amounts of less than $200.238  The disparity between large-dollar and 
small-dollar contributors becomes much larger, however, once the effects of Governor Dean’s 
substantial small-donor fundraising are factored out of the totals.  Dean led the candidates in 
fundraising, raising $50.6 million in individual contributions.239  59% of Dean’s money came 
in amounts less than $200, while only 19% came in amounts of $1,000 or more.240  Of the 
$110 million in individual contributions raised by the other nine candidates, 63% was 
collected in amounts of $1,000 or more and only 19% came in amounts less than $200.241
The fundraising percentages of these candidates were similar to those of the 2000 Democratic 
primary campaign, where Vice President Al Gore and former New Jersey Senator Bill 
Bradley raised a total of $60 million in individual contributions, with 65% collected in 
amounts of $1,000 or more and only 15% collected in amounts less than $200.242  Thus, while 
the totals for the 2004 Democratic presidential primary campaign are significantly different 
than they were in 2000, these differences were mostly due to the Dean campaign’s success 
raising money from small donors over the Internet.  Using this approach, Dean’s ratio of 
small-dollar to large-dollar contributions was almost the mirror image of the combined ratio 
of the other candidates.243
Clark, Governor Dean, Senator John Edwards (N.C.), Congressman Richard Gephardt (Mo.), Senator Bob 
Graham (Fla.), Senator Kerry, Congressman Dennis Kucinich (Ohio), Senator Joe Lieberman (Conn.), former 
Senator Carol Moseley Braun (Ill.), and Reverend Al Sharpton.  Id.
238 Id.  By comparison, over the same period President George W. Bush raised $155.8 million in individual 
contributions.  Id.  75% of Bush’s contributions came in amounts of $1,000 or more, while only 17% of his 
contributions came in amounts less than $200.  Id.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., 2000 PRESIDENTIAL FUNDRAISING FROM INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS AS OF FEBRUARY 
29, 2004, at http://www.cfinst.org/pr/pdf/Table1_Feb.pdf (last visited June 24, 2004).
243
 Representative Kucinich actually raised a higher percentage of his funds from small donors than Dean (68%) 
and a lower percentage of his funds in contributions of $1,000 or more (13%).  2004 PRESIDENTIAL 
FUNDRAISING, supra note 237.  Kucinich only raised $6 million, however.  Id.
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The Dean campaign also made effective use of the Internet as a tool for grassroots 
organizing.244  The campaign used the Internet to organize its operations under a decentralized 
model and coordinate with self-organized networks of volunteers in places where it had no 
formal organizational presence.245  Unlike most campaigns, which are run from the top down 
with tight controls on their message and activities, the Dean campaign made efforts to
mobilize supporters who acted independently on behalf of the campaign.246  The campaign 
proved itself responsive to suggestions from these grassroots activists, with whom it 
communicated via Internet web logs.247  While no study has yet been done of the number of 
active Dean volunteers who also supported the campaign through small-dollar contributions, 
the overlap was likely substantial.  The Dean campaign successfully engaged large numbers 
of citizens at the grassroots level by making use of the Internet to solicit small donations and 
encourage active participation in campaign events.248  Although the Dean campaign was not 
itself successful in turning grassroots enthusiasm into victories at the polls, politicians of all 
stripes have sought to incorporate the successful aspects of Dean’s Internet strategy into their 
own campaigns.249
General Wesley Clark declared his candidacy for the 2004 Democratic presidential 
nomination in late September 2003, just two weeks before the end of the third fundraising 
244
 For a more detailed discussion of the Dean strategy, see generally TRIPPI, supra note 8. 
245 See Jim Drinkard & Jill Lawrence, Online, off and running: Web gains clout on campaign front, USA 
TODAY, July 15, 2003, at 1A (reporting that “Dean . . . is rewriting the playbook on how to organize, finance and 
mold a presidential campaign”).
246 See id. (reporting that groups of Dean supporters have independently organized activities such as letter-
writing campaigns and community service projects with the blessing of the campaign).
247 Id.
248 See Liz Marlantes, Web May Revolutionize Fundraising, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 31, 2003, at 2 (“One 
aspect that makes the Internet particularly intriguing as a campaign tool is that, unlike television – the main 
political medium for a half-century – it gives people a heightened sense of connection to campaigns and even a 
degree of empowerment.”).
249 See Susan Page, While losing, Dean transformed race, politics, USA TODAY, Feb. 9, 2004, at 1A (“Now 
[other candidates] have copied the techniques that worked, from telethon-like fundraising challenges to chatty 
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quarter.250  In those two weeks, the Clark campaign reported that it quickly raised $3.5 million 
in contributions in amounts averaging $175 per donor.251  Two thirds of Clark’s contributions 
were raised online.252  Once Clark established himself as a serious contender for the 
Democratic nomination, his fundraising practices evolved into those of a more traditional 
candidate.253  Clark raised a total of $17.3 million in individual contributions in the 2004 
Democratic presidential primary campaign, with 49% coming in amounts of $1,000 or more 
and 31% coming in amounts less than $200.254  Nevertheless, Clark’s early reliance on 
Internet fundraising from small donors made his candidacy possible.
Clark’s success with Internet fundraising coincided with the manner in which he 
began his campaign.  For months prior to the official declaration of his candidacy, Clark 
supporters – without any direct contact with the general – organized the “Draft Wesley Clark” 
movement, a grassroots political movement aimed at setting up a rudimentary campaign 
organization for the general and convincing him to run.255  Prior to Clark’s entry into the race, 
the movement had generated more than $1 million in pledges for campaign contributions and 
recruited volunteers and operatives in all 50 states.256  Like the Dean campaign, the Draft 
Wesley Clark movement showed that the Internet has opened up tremendous new possibilities 
for grassroots candidates who are funded by small donors.
With both Dean and Clark using Internet fundraising and organizing efforts to 
establish themselves as viable candidates for the 2004 Democratic primaries, it is clear that 
250
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the Internet has already started to change the face of political campaigns.  The Internet 
provides an exciting new way for campaigns to tap large pools of potential small donors, and 
it could help make a federal tax credit for political contributions more significant to a 
grassroots political campaign than was ever previously possible.   Much as Minnesota 
Governor Jesse Ventura was able to take advantage of the PCR program in fundraising 
appeals on his web site,257 the fundraising drives of federal candidates could feature on their 
campaign websites a prominent display reading “Contribute Here…For Free” or “Support 
[Candidate] and Get Your Money Back.”  Experience with political contribution incentive 
programs in the states suggests that participation in a political contribution incentive program 
is chiefly dependant on the efforts of candidates and other political agents to promote the 
program in their fundraising efforts.258  The style of campaigning employed by Dean and 
Clark – using the Internet to appeal directly to small donors and organize volunteers – is well-
suited to encouraging donor participation with the help of a tax credit for political 
contributions.  It is not surprising, then, that Howard Dean – who made campaign finance 
reform an important focus of his campaign – called for a 100% tax credit for the first $100 of 
every individual contribution to a federal candidate.259
If there had been a federal tax credit for political contributions on the books during the 
2004 Democratic primary campaign, the Dean campaign’s phenomenal Internet fundraising 
success would undoubtedly have been even greater.  The Dean campaign became known for 
its constant, creative use of email solicitation to encourage its supporters to make small 
contributions whenever they could afford them.260  This steady stream of email into Dean 
supporters’ inboxes made it very easy for them to contribute whenever they were inclined to 
257 See supra text accompanying notes 140 – 143.
258 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 133.
259 DEAN FOR AMERICA, “TAKE BACK OUR DEMOCRACY”: AN AGENDA FOR REAL CAMPAIGN REFORM (2003).  
In Dean’s proposal, the tax credit would only be available to Americans earning $50,000 or less per year 
($100,000 for joint returns).  Id.
260 See Page, supra note 249, at 1A.
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do so.261  Yet if the Dean campaign also had been able to promote a tax credit for political 
contributions as part of its fundraising appeal, the knowledge that they would receive $100 of 
their contributions back at tax time would have made it substantially easier for Dean’s 
supporters to give.  Although Howard Dean fell short of his goal of raising $200 million by 
attracting $100 contributions from 2 million Americans,262 a $100 tax credit could have made 
this a much more attainable goal.
Moreover, as the fundraising successes of General Wesley Clark and Governor Jesse 
Ventura demonstrate, the benefits of a political contributions incentive program are not 
limited to candidates of any one party or ideological affiliation.  Prospective small donors will 
come in all ideological shapes and partisan sizes, and contribution incentives will benefit any 
candidate who can effectively reach out to small donors and persuade them to contribute.
C. A voucher system is a fairer and more effective way to administer political 
contribution incentives over the long term
The tax code is a frequently used vehicle for federal policy making.  The Internal 
Revenue Service administers a complex system of regulations; adding one additional tax 
credit to the system will create only marginal administrative costs.  Nevertheless, creating a 
political contribution incentive in the tax code has two major disadvantages.  First, using the 
tax code weakens the incentive by making it more complicated to claim and making 
reimbursement less immediate.  Second, a significant percentage of the population, 
particularly those with low incomes, will not have the tax liability necessary to take advantage 
of a tax credit.  Because of these disadvantages, a federal tax credit for political contributions 
261 See, e.g., Paul Boutin, Howard’s Web: The Internet couldn’t save Dean, but it could still help Kerry, SLATE, 
Feb. 18, 2004, at http://slate.msn.com/id/2095707 (last visited June 7, 2004) (“According to contribution charts 
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dispersed over a wide range of ZIP codes. Sounds like a classic example of the Internet's reach and convenience. 
. . .  A friend surprised me yesterday by admitting he's given $150 to Dean in several batches, in part because 
‘they made it so easy.’”).
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is only a short-term solution to the problem of small-donor participation in campaign finance.  
Once the tax credit is enacted, campaign finance reform advocates should press for its 
expansion into a comprehensive campaign finance voucher system such as that advocated by 
Professors Ackerman and Ayres.
Many citizens do not even file tax returns, and of those who do many do not have 
sufficient tax liability to take advantage of a new tax credit.  The estimated voting-age 
population for the 2002 election was 215,139,087.263  In 2002, Americans filed a total of 
130,201,415 tax returns representing 181,730,902 adults.264  Those adults who had no reason 
to file taxes at all would be unable to take advantage of a new tax credit.  Of those who did 
file tax returns, only 102,479,207 owed income tax prior to claiming any tax credits.265  After 
taking advantage of existing tax credits, only 91,078,178 still had additional tax liability.266
While some taxpayers may be able to structure their behavior differently in response to the 
addition of a new tax credit, a significant percentage of tax filers will have no use for it.  One 
way to address this problem is to make the tax credit refundable, so that individuals are fully 
reimbursed whether they have tax liability or not.   While this change would raise the cost of 
the credit to the public treasury, it would do so in a way that makes participation accessible to 
more Americans.
For citizens who can take advantage of a traditional tax credit, participating in the 
credit program requires that they in effect float an interest-free loan to a candidate or other 
political agent that the government will ultimately repay.  Even for credits that provide 100% 
reimbursement, the donors must lay out their own money and bear the opportunity costs 
between the time of the contribution and the time their taxes are processed.
263 MICHAEL MCDONALD, VOTING AGE POPULATION AND VOTING ELIGIBLE POPULATION ESTIMATES, at 
http://elections.gmu.edu/VAP_VEP.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2004).
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These obstacles to full participation in a tax credit program make it worthwhile to 
explore means to administer political contribution incentives outside of the tax code.  The 
Minnesota contribution refund program provides one model.  Though the contribution refund 
program is administered by the same state agency that oversees the state’s income tax system, 
applications for refunds are processed year-round and are in no way linked to whether the 
donor files a tax return or has tax liability.267  The Minnesota contribution refund program 
makes political contribution incentives available to all citizens, not just those with tax 
liability, and by offering reimbursement in the short term it creates a stronger incentive to 
contribute.  Nevertheless, the contribution refund program does not completely eliminate all 
opportunity costs that discourage full participation by new contributors, for it still requires 
contributors to lay out their own money and wait several weeks for their refund to be 
processed.
Administering political contribution incentives through a campaign finance voucher 
system is the most effective long-term way to encourage small donor participation.  A federal 
tax credit for political contributions is an important, and perhaps even a necessary, step 
toward that long-term goal.  While a new federal tax credit would not provide an incentive to 
all Americans, it has significant potential to encourage those it does reach to give small 
contributions to political campaigns.  As the effects of political contribution incentive 
programs are proven over time, they can be expanded into more comprehensive programs.
267
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V. Conclusion
Political contribution incentive programs are a highly promising approach to the 
challenge of increasing the voice of small donors in political campaigns.  The programs 
empower small donors while also bringing new dollars into the campaign fundraising process 
that balance to some extent the dominant role played by the small percentage of Americans 
who can afford to give large donations.  Political contribution incentive programs bolster the 
viability of candidates who direct their campaigns primarily toward grassroots constituencies.  
The success of Governor Jesse Ventura in Minnesota – due in part to his active solicitation of 
contributions through the contribution refund program – shows that political contribution 
incentive programs can actually work to level the political playing field if enacted as part of a 
more comprehensive package of reforms such as low contribution limits or public financing, 
or both.  Meanwhile, presidential candidates Howard Dean and Wesley Clark demonstrated 
the potential of the Internet as an organizing tool for small donors on a national scale.  A 
political contribution incentive program at the federal level would provide an even greater 
boost to dynamic campaigns as diverse as those of Jesse Ventura, Howard Dean, and Wesley 
Clark that seek to engage average Americans from across the political spectrum and promote 
popular participation in politics.  
In order to be effective, political contribution incentive programs must cover 
contributions to a broad range of political agents and be potent enough that both contributors 
and recipients have an incentive to use them.  The background of laws and regulations upon 
which the program is placed also can enhance or undermine its effectiveness.  Ultimately, 
participation in incentive programs is driven more by the activities of the recipients of 
contributions than by the circumstances of the donors.  To maximize participation, incentive 
programs should apply to donations to PACs as well as candidates and parties.  In the current 
federal system, where contribution limits are high and other forms of public financing of 
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campaigns are limited, a tax credit may only have modest effects on the demand of candidates 
and parties for small-dollar contributions.  Many PACs, however, are likely to have a high 
demand for small-dollar contributions; making them eligible for the credit could greatly 
increase credit participation rates and foster issue-centered political activity that is important 
to a healthy, well-functioning democracy.
A tax credit for political contributions is not a panacea, but it may be an important 
incremental step toward more comprehensive reforms.  The cost of the tax credit is a small 
investment in democracy that could yield substantial dividends in increasing the voice of 
average Americans and possibly also lead to greater long-term citizen involvement.  A tax 
credit would encourage citizens to make small annual investments in politics that would give 
them a sense of ownership over their democracy.  Proposals for a tax credit also could be 
linked with other important reform measures, such as those that provide public funding to 
match small donor contributions.  More importantly, even a modestly successful tax credit 
could furnish important evidence that political contribution incentives work to reduce political 
inequality in the campaign finance system.  Since the FEC now itemizes contributions of $200 
or more, it is now possible to measure with greater precision the effects that political 
contribution incentive programs have on small donor participation.  If the available evidence 
proves persuasive, then the principles underlying political contribution incentives could be 
feasibly expanded into a system of voucher-based public financing.  Such a system would 
give all citizens opportunities for full and equal participation in political campaigns and would 
completely redefine the way campaigns are conducted.  A well-funded voucher system would 
create a new kind of political market, one in which significant private wealth does not enjoy 
disproportionate influence.  In this new market, a candidate’s most effective means of 
campaigning would be to communicate his or her ideas to the voting public.
